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resumo 
 
 
É evidente que a crise financeira atual se parece com a Grande Depressão. 
Esta dissertação providencia uma comparação entra ambas as crises. Ainda 
nesta dissertação vão ser explicados os eventos que inicialmente a 
deflagraram bem como a explicação de como é que uma economia, com a 
expansão incrível como a Americana, pode entrar em recessão em 1929, e 
sofrer agora dos mesmos problemas. A falta de restrições tanto antes como 
agora causaram um “boom” de crédito que afetou o mercado imobiliário e o 
mercado bolsista criando assim uma bolha. Por último esta tese compara as 
diferenças entre os políticos de outrora e os atuais, ficando uma pergunta por 
responder até hoje: Será que os políticos atuais aprenderam a lição dos seus 
antecessores? 
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abstract 
 
It is a fact that the current world crisis resembles the Great Depression. This 
thesis provides a comparison between both crises. The events that originally 
deflagrated them will be explained, as well as how does an economy with an 
incredibly expansion such as the US’ can fall in to a recession in 1929, and 
suffers now from the same problems. The lack of restrictions then and now 
caused a credit boom that affected the real estate market, and the stock market 
creating a bubble. And finally this thesis will compare the differences between 
the policy makers of then and now, and will answer to the question that still 
remains today which is: How well did policy makers have learned their lesson 
from their ancestors past mistakes? 
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1 Introduction 
Every day, people are bombarded by the media with news about the actual 
conjuncture of the World, reminding them that we are living in a crisis. Some 
economists have compared it with “the mother of all crisis”, The Great 
Depression. The Great Depression has been the longest, deepest, broadest 
and most severe depression the world has ever seen. The Great Depression 
could be the most studied phenomenon of the economic world and if there are 
voices that compare the current crisis with the Great Depression, it means that 
this is a phenomenon that will need some attention by the economic scholars. 
There are several similarities between these two crises that cannot be 
neglected. 
The Great Depression started at a time of great development where the 
technological advances before The Great Depression were simply staggering. 
There were booms in almost every US (United States) market. No one would 
have thought that, in the 1920’s, a depression was lurking around the corner, 
and that its magnitude was simply impossible for the population to comprehend.  
The epicenter of The Great Depression was, with no doubt, in the US but it 
soon spread to the rest of the World. The decade between 1929 and 1939 was 
a test for the worldwide population on how things could get increasingly difficult 
in a short period of time. In these 10 years the US has experienced, from its 
upper to its lowest point, several falls: 50% in its industrial production, 30% in its 
Real GDP (Growth Domestic Product) and 33% in its wholesale price. In 1933 
unemployment reached its peak of 25%, and it maintained above 15% 
throughout The Great Depression (Kraner, 2010). 
When comparing the two crises there is a similarity that sticks to the eye. 
Both of them were preceded by years of great development and great booms  
which eventually originated a bust. The 1920’s decade, also called the Roaring 
twenties, was characterized by its easy credit, housing boom, and excessive 
leverage while the current recession, also called The Great Recession, is 
characterized by the subprime bubble in the early 2000’s (Grossman & 
Meissner, 2010). 
The comparison between the data of 1929 and the data of 2007 shows that 
the beginning of the current recession was not that severe as it did not hit 
industrial production as hard as it was thought, and even the stock market crash 
was not affected as much as during the Great Depression. There are other 
items that suggest that the Great Recession is a little more serious. For 
example, the unemployment, that increased up to 10%, according to The New 
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York Times of November 6 of 2009, is still far from the 25% in its peak during 
the Great Depression (Schlenkhoff, 2009). 
Although the numbers were far greater and alarming in The Great 
Depression, one thing is certain, the problems the world is facing today are very 
similar to the ones of 1929. One thing still remains uncertain though… Have 
policymakers learned anything from the past? 
At least today the Fed (Federal Reserve) is governed by a great scholar of 
the Great Depression, Bernanke who learned from it and is taking actions to 
solve it before it is too late. We cannot tell the same from the policymakers of 
The Great Depression. But is it enough? 
 
1.1 Objectives and Aims 
 Identification and explanation of the Causes that led to the Great 
Depression; 
 Identification and explanation of the Causes that led to the Great 
Recession/Subprime crisis; 
 Explanation on how The Great Depression went global; 
 Explanation on how The Great Recession/Subprime crisis  went global; 
 Understanding of the Great Depression’s lessons; 
 Comparison between both crises; 
 The role of fixed exchange rates during the two crises. 
 
1.2 Methodology and structure of the Thesis 
This thesis will discuss theory and practice, and an historical framework will 
be adopted. The method used will be descriptive and comparative. For a better 
understanding this thesis was divided by chapters as follows:    
 In the 2nd Chapter the precedents of the Great Depression will be 
addressed as well as the causes of the crisis as well as its development 
from 1929 to 1930. The main areas that led to the Great Depression will 
be discussed in this chapter. These areas include the Money and 
Financial Markets, Labor Markets, Spending, Stock Market Crash, Real 
Estate, Banking System and the Gold Standard. In the last 4 
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subchapters, opinions from some of the greatest economists of our time 
will be discussed, about the end of The Great Depression, the lessons 
learned and if the lessons learned could avoid a similar crisis. The final 
subchapter contains a table with a summary of all these economists 
opinion over the Great Depression; 
 The 3rd chapter contains an overview of the economy prior to The Great 
Recession, and the causes that ultimately led to the financial crisis. The 
main causes discussed in this chapter are: Real Estate, Spending, 
Financial Institutions, Banking System, the role of the Fed and 
International Labor Shocks; 
 The 4th Chapter consists of a comparison between the two crises, the 
lessons learned from policy makers and how they are reacting to the 
problems that emerged. The last subchapter addresses the problems of 
the fixed exchange rate systems before and now; 
 The 5th Chapter is composed by the conclusions of the thesis 
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2 Great Depression 
To understand the nature and the context of the Great Depression, there are 
some factors that need to be explained. These factors are what differentiate it 
from a mild recession like the one in 1921 to the Great Depression.  
The decade of 1920’s was the basis for what was about to happen.  
Before the Keynesian theory, classical economists believed that the markets 
would always follow an equilibrium path and that all the sellers would find their 
buyers. They consider deflation as a salutary force that permitted the reduction 
of relative wages, allowing entrepreneurs to employ an increased volume of 
laborers. Inflation was seen as an evil that should be purged from the economic 
system. Classical economists believed that if the inflation was to rise sharply, 
the risk of holding currency would increase dramatically which in turn could lead 
the currency to collapse, so inflation was to be avoided at all costs. 
According to the classic theory the government needed only little 
intervention, save for the most minimal legal standards and property rights. The 
Government should only have 3 main functions: protection against foreign 
invaders, citizens’ protection from wrongs committed against them by other 
citizens, and building and maintaining public institutions and public works that 
the private sector could not profitably provide. The government should not 
interfere in the market since it was thought that the market would be 
automatically adjusted according to Adam Smith theory of the invisible hand.  
This framework only impeded the control of prices, and competition. 
The 1920’s was a decade of remarkable innovation, technological advance, 
and economic growth. It was the decade of the electricity, the telephone, indoor 
plumbing, and mass production of automobiles (Gwartney, Stroup, Sobel & 
Macpherson, 2010), and so it has become known has the “roaring twenties”. 
The standard of living was increasing mainly due to the increase in 
productivity and in the supply of goods, which in turn was lowering the costs 
and prices. This tendency was impeded by the monetary inflation which served 
to stabilize prices. This kind of stabilization was preventing an even higher 
standard of living and generated the boom and the depression of the business 
cycle (Rothbard, 2000). 
The stock market was also affected by the phenomenon of great growth and 
development of the 1920’s decade and so the prices of stock shares rose 
sharply. According to Romer, the stock prices increased more than four times 
from 1921 to its peak in 1929. The household market was also increasing at a 
very high rate and in the mid 1920’s the household market had an excess of 
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supply. This tendency only changed by the end of the decade when there was a 
huge drop in prices of houses that were being built (Parker, 2007). 
The US banking system was on the forefront of banking innovation, it 
created “tools” to expand even more the growth of that decade. Credit was easy 
to obtain and at low rates, and because banks needed few capital and reserve 
requirements there was an increase of the money supply.  US’ banking system 
had a very particular modus operandi comparing to other countries. It was 
composed by small, independent banks. There was also another major 
difference: the banks were regulated by different supervisors, which meant that 
there were different capital requirements, reserve requirements and branching 
laws for each type of bank. 
The Labor Market was also suffering enormous changes during this time. 
Before the 1920’s the labor market was characterized by long working hours 
with low productivity, but during that period it started to change to a labor 
market with fewer working hours and increased productivity. 
The economy was at its best in the 1920’s decade. No one thought a 
depression could be lurking around the corner, and much less with this extent, 
severity and duration. 
2.1 Money and Financial Markets 
For a better acknowledgement of what was about to happen to Money and 
Financial Markets, the pre-World War I markets need to be discussed. 
Before the 1st World War, Britain was the US main lending country. When 
World War I began US was starting to reduce its international debt. 
According to Temin (1994) the War led Britain to stop all exports of capital, 
and started importing capital mainly from US to fuel the fires of war. The US 
was Britain’s main debtor. Its debts reached at least 3.5 billion dollars before the 
War, but during the War the roles reversed and the US passed to a creditor 
position of more than 7 billion dollars.  
The War also led to the halt of the gold standard convertibility, and although 
in 1920 there were several countries that wanted to reinstate the gold standard, 
the feat was difficult to accomplish due to the lack of gold availability to satisfy 
world money demands without deflation (Bernanke, 2000). 
To quickly restore the gold standard, in 1922, the Economic and Monetary 
Conference at Genoa suggested the adoption of a gold exchange standard, in 
which convertible foreign exchange reserves (principally dollars and pounds), 
as well as gold, would be used to back up national money supplies. This 
measure allowed to “economize” gold. (Lindert, 1969; Eichengreen, 1995). 
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Most of the countries managed to return to the gold standard in the 
1920’s decade, although there was a slight problem.  The currencies 
returned at the same parity they had before the War. The pound was 
overvalued and the franc returned at an undervalued parity (Bernanke, 
2000, pp.125).  
Later, in this thesis this point will be addressed showing the effects of the 
gold outflows of Britain and gold inflows of both US and France due to the 
different parities.  
In the financial markets there were also changes that led to a financial crisis. 
The financial crisis started in 1929, when the Fed was trying to prevent the 
speculative bubble on the stock market. To prevent the speculative bubble on 
the stock market the Fed chose to increase interest rates, that way it would 
discourage speculators on contracting loans to “play” on the stock market. It’s 
true that the Fed managed to do what they wanted (the bubble bursted), what 
they didn’t expect was that the rise in interest rates would affect the rest of the 
economy that were dependent on loans. The increase of interest rates led to a 
decrease of the velocity and thus the decrease in money supply. The US was at 
hand with a severe money contraction (Temin, 1994). The graph bellow gives 
us an overall view on the money contraction after 1929. 
 
Illustration 1: Yields on 3-month U.S. Treasury Bills, 20-Year U.S. Government Bonds, 
and 4-6 month commercial paper, monthly, 1919-1940 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Money and Interest Rates in The United States During the Great 
Depression” by P. Basile, J. Landon-Lane and H. Rockoff, 2010, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, [Working Paper Nº 16204], pp. 28. Copyright 2010 by Peter F. Basile, John Landon-
Lane, and Hugh Rockoff. 
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2.2 Labor Market 
According to Bernanke (2000), the Labor market prior to the 1920’s decade 
was characterized by long working hours, low productivity and low wages. 
These characteristics can be explained if we know that prior 1920’s Labor 
Market consisted mainly in Agriculture. 
Before 1920’s the Agricultural Sector was thriving since the Europeans were 
in dire need of food due to World War I. 
During World War I, Europe was in need of food and fiber to feed the 
militaries. When the War was over, Europe started producing these products. 
The US and other Europe’s food suppliers that expanded their productions to 
meet the demands were now facing an excessive output. Eventually, the prices 
fell and the farmers were facing debts they couldn’t afford. They expanded and 
contracted loans expecting that the high prices would continue, but now with the 
decrease of prices that followed they couldn’t afford those loans and there were 
a great number of insolvencies among the sector. This led to a restructure of 
the Agricultural sector in the early 1920’s, with the low prices, the wages were 
falling, the working hours were diminishing, and so did the output (Temin, 
1994).  
The 1920’s work organization started to change (due to the pressure of the 
public opinion, and Unions), the long working hours were reduced, there was a 
substantial increase in productivity, and the wages were rising. With all these 
changes in the 1920’s decade, wages started to be less flexible (O’Brien, 1989). 
Despite the raise in wages, that did not meant the real weekly wages were 
higher. Although the new wages were higher the working hours were lower, so 
this would mean that in real terms the gains that could be used for consumption 
were almost the same. In the graph bellow there is evidence that the hours 
worked per adult dropped abruptly after 1929, but there was only a shy increase 
of the detrended Mfg Wages.  
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Illustration 2: Total Hours Worked per Adult (blue), Detrended Mfg Wages (green), 
1929=100 
 
Source: Adapted from “New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A 
General Equilibrium Analysis” by H. Cole and L. Ohanian, 2004, Journal of Political Economy, 
112 (4). Copyright 2004 by the University of Chicago Press.  Retrieved from Yglesias (2011). 
 
In 1929, the output, and output prices were starting to decline due to the 
Depression, the lack of demand, and lack of money supply. While the prices of 
output got lower, the wages were rising in terms of real wages due to its rigidity. 
That only led to a decrease of labor demand (Bernanke, 2000).  
According to Ohanian (2009) the main responsible for this incredible change 
in the labor market was Hoover himself. Employment was a serious factor for 
the government, so Hoover tried to correct the market the best way he could. 
Hoover believed that if the wages were kept high and there was job sharing 
instead of lay-offs the economy could recover, so his policies included 
increasing salaries and encouraged job-sharing. What Hoover didn’t predict was 
that his policies would create deflation. Due to the inflation-adjusted value real 
wages rose, and productivity was decreasing, so companies were in no position 
to accommodate such increase in wages.  According to the same author, the 
companies tried to maintain as long as possible the wages freeze, so instead of 
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lowering wages they preferred to reduce the workweek and to lay-off workers. 
That led to disaster since the Aggregate Demand dropped substantially.  
There was a huge difference between how Hoover’s policies affected the 
Agricultural Sector and the Manufacturing Sector. The Agricultural Sector was 
still in a phase of restructuring due to the crisis of excess of supply after the 
World War I. The Agricultural Sector was readjusting from all their excesses and 
so Hoover’s policies didn’t apply to them as much as for the Manufacturing 
sector.  The Agricultural sector was completely independent of what was being 
set for the manufacturing sector. 
For the Manufacturing Sector, Hoover’s intentions drove the industrial wages 
to increase, and employment sharply depressed to values that were never seen 
before. Hoover’s policies led the overall gross national product, to decrease. As 
described in Anonymous (2009) Ohanian believes his policy was the most 
important factor that led in the precipitation of the Great Depression.  
In the mid-1933 the nominal wages were on the rise again, even faster than 
prices. This was due to the legislative programs which thought the solution was 
to raise wages. The output was recovering well, but the working hours were 
recovering slowly (Bernanke, 2000). 
From 1929 to mid-1933 Industrial Production declined by 37 percent, prices 
by 33 percent, and real GDP by 30 percent, nominal GDP fell by almost 50 
percent. Unemployment reached a peak of 25 percent and it stayed above 15 
percent for the rest of the 1930’s decade (Temin, 1994). The graph bellow 
shows how unemployment reached its peak of 25% in 1933 and continued over 
15% until 1937 but in the following year it increased again over the 15% barrier. 
 
Illustration 3: Unemployment in the Great Depression 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Graph: Unemployment in the Great Depression”, by Awesome 
stories (n.d.) 
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In the beginning of the Great Depression there was no social security 
whatsoever and when there was a decline in spending, due to the lack of 
demand, the employment suffered. As the lack of demand increased 
unemployment, the lack of social security reduced even more the demand, and 
a vicious circle started (Leite, 2005). 
 
2.3 Decline in Spending 
Many economists believe the cause of the Great Depression was the fall in 
Aggregate Demand. In the description of the Labor Markets, there is evidence 
of the shock that slowed down the aggregate demand. The fall in output and the 
fall in prices that started in the 1920’s decade is an irrefutable fact.  
An Aggregate demand shock is generated when in the short run the 
economy moves away from full employment level of output but prices remain 
unchanged. The decline in Aggregate Demand causes a recession or, in more 
severe cases, a depression. Meanwhile in the long term the economy will try to 
adjust to a new point of equilibrium, the enterprises will want to produce their 
goods at their normal capacity and the increase in inventories will cause the 
prices to fall. The output will be at its full-employment level but the price level 
will fall (Kraner, 2010). 
 
2.4 Stock Market Crash 1929 
As it was said before the 1920’s was a decade of great innovation, 
technological advance and economic growth. The stock market was 
accompanying the evolution.  
The factors that led to the stock market crash of 1929 started in the 1920’s. 
In the 1920’s the ease on getting loans and low interest rates was leading the 
stock market to raise without precedents, people thought the tendency of the 
stock market was to always go up. Even people with only a small amount of 
money to invest were attracted to the stock market and its easy way to gain 
money. When stock markets fell, people thought it was a temporary setback 
and looked at it like an opportunity to buy stocks at a lower price (Granville, 
1995). 
People from very different backgrounds were attracted to the stock market. 
The euphoric run-up of stock prices was the recipe to disaster leading to the 
biggest market panic that the world has seen (Bordo & James, 2009). 
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According to Temin (1994) in 1928 and 1929, with the intention of stopping 
the stock market bubble that was being formed, the Fed adopted contractionary 
monetary policies. The Fed believed they could restrict the credit only for the 
stock market but they were dead wrong. 
From their lowest point in 1921 to their peak in 1929 the stock prices 
increased more than four times their value. The New York stock market was 
living years of spectacular rises in stock prices, the Dow Jones industrial 
average in the early 1928 was at a low of 191, by December it reached 300, 
and by September of 1929 it reached 381, it doubled in two years (Romer, 
2003; Kindleberger 1986). 
 
Illustration 4: Dow Jones Industrial Average: 1925-1955 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1925 to 1955” by J. Smithson, 
2009, September 17 [Web log post] 
 
In October of 1929, the Fed managed to make the stock market bubble to 
burst. Even after the stock market crash the economy was having a modest 
recession, similar to the ones in 1924 and 1927, and so it was unpredictable at 
this time that the recession would continue and at a point it violently worsened 
(Galbraith 2009).  
Bordo and James (2009) point out that “Stock Exchange collapses or the 
end of asset bubbles do not necessarily lead to prolonged recessions of deep 
depression” (p.4-5). That was indeed the case. The market crash created other 
effects, and those effects only worsened the expectations of the population on 
what was about to happen.  
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The stock market crash was responsible for reducing private wealth by 
about 10 percent, consumers’ assets were reduced and their debts maintained. 
The lack of confidence led the consumers to decrease their consumption, 
mainly the consumption of durable goods. In 1930 it was noticeable a fall in 
consumption (Temin, 1994). Romer (2003) described the same effect as Temin, 
she describes that “The stock market crash reduced American Aggregate 
Demand substantially. Consumer purchases of durable goods and business 
investment fell sharply after the crash. A likely explanation is that the financial 
crisis generated considerable uncertainty about future income, which in turn led 
consumers and firms to put off purchases of durable goods.” (p. 3). 
 
Illustration 5: US Aggregate Demand GDP 1920-1940 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Steve Keen’s Scary Model” by Y. Smith, 2010, July 4 [Web log 
post] 
 
2.5 Real Estate Bubble  
Many economists point out the stock market bubble as an important factor of 
the Great Depression, but there are also a few that defend the real estate 
bubble as an important factor as well. 
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The main reason to consider the real estate bubble even more important 
than the stock market bubble is the simple fact that the real estate bubble 
affected a greater part of the population.  
During the 1920’s decade due to the low interest rates and to the lack of 
restrictions over loans the real estate market was flourishing, and it did flourish 
until 1925. Among the real estate market, construction of residential housing 
was the one with greater increases.  According to Meyer the real estate market 
was divided in 3 phases, from 1912 to 1922 there wasn’t enough houses being 
built, in 1922 to 1926 the demand was being met, and after that the real estate 
market had become a speculative market (Butkiewicz, 2005). 
Real estate markets have changed since the World War I, mortgage 
financing started to be more and more usual as new entrants would join the real 
estate business. Before the World War I mortgage funding accounted for less 
than 45 percent of residential construction finance. In 1926 mortgage funding 
reached 60 percent representing 3.3 billion dollars (White, 2009). 
 
Illustration 6: Sources of Funding for residential construction, 1911 - 1929 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Lessons From The Great American Real Estate Boom And Bust Of 
The 1920’s” by E. White, 2009, National Bureau of Economic Research, [Working Paper Nº 
15573], pp. 24. Copyright 2009 by Peter Eugene N. White. 
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The sources of finance were also changing. The increase of lending by more 
aggressive lenders, such as commercial banks and insurance companies, was 
allowing that more and more people could own a house. 
There was a lack of liquidity among the household market, and so to ease 
up that lack of liquidity people would go for an equity loan or a refinance that 
they are going to cash out of their house. This generates a distortion. The main 
collaterals of mortgages are households and if there is a bubble on household 
prices, it creates a big distortion. Abramovitz explains the situation US was 
living with the reference of what happened in Chicago. Chicago was living years 
of great urbanization, the prices of houses and lands were increasing 
dramatically, so banks were willing to lend more money. As long as the prices 
kept increasing everything was going to be bailed out. That produced a real 
estate bubble, but when the supply caught up with the demand the bubble 
busted, and the banks realized they were full of illiquid assets which originated 
a banking panic (Parker, 2002). 
This is an example of what happened all over America.  
Due to the increase in banking loans, with the burst of the real estate bubble 
the banks were now facing major liquidity problems. The households given as 
collaterals lost their value, and with the excessive supply generated by frenetic 
construction were getting even harder to sell.  
Banks everywhere were struggling to avoid insolvency. 
 
2.6 Banking System and Monetary Contraction 
The US banking system was different from any other banking systems in the 
world. It was composed by small independent banks. This was due to the fear 
US had of large banks and “trusts”, and so there were regulations made to 
avoid them from having a large size. 
Even before the crisis US had realized that it needed an institution to 
prevent financial panics, and so the Fed was created in December 1913, with 
the particular mission of preventing further financial panics.  
Since its creation the Fed has expanded and evolved, and became 
responsible of supervising the banking system. According to Bernanke, in 1921, 
already with the Fed in control there was serious deflation. The banking system 
was lacking rules. Banks were not properly capitalized, the reserves were low, 
and the anti-branching laws were causing local monopolies and creating more 
and more inefficient banks (Parker, 2007). 
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Still the confidence in US’ banking system was high, they had recently 
managed to solve a crisis in the agricultural sector. 
As it was explained before, the agriculture crisis started when food suppliers 
were producing excessive output due to the lack of consumption by the 
Europeans which led to lower prices. Farmers intended to pay the loans they 
contracted with the revenue from their crops and as the prices lowered they 
couldn’t afford to pay their loans. The insolvencies that occurred during that 
time were mainly in the south and west, generated by the decline on agricultural 
prices and land values.  According to Mitchener (1991), after 1920, financial 
economists were advocating an increase in capital requirements and reserve 
requirements. At least in the states that suffered the most by the agricultural 
crisis there was a change in capital requirements, reserve requirements, and 
branching laws. The deflation was controlled and mass insolvencies were 
avoided, although the effect only improved confidence over the banking system 
that was adopted (Parker, 2007). The agriculture crisis served to boost US’ 
confidence on its banking system. 
The US banking system has worked properly over the 1920’s decade and 
the low interest rates that were being practiced pushed the development of the 
economy to a level that was never seen before. The real estate was in all times 
high until 1925 and the stock market was also at its best, but when the stock 
market crashed in 1929 together with the real estate, the confidence of the 
general population was shaken. The US’ banking system was about to be 
tested, but at this time there was a major difference in the banking system 
safety net.  
According to Bernanke before the Fed was created, there was the possibility 
of suspending convertibility of bank deposits into currency, so the danger of 
“runs” on banks was limited by the clearing houses that provided enough 
liquidity to avoid the depletion of deposits. The clearing houses were the lender 
of last resort. The clearing houses realized it wasn’t their role anymore of being 
the lender of last resort, now it was the Fed’s job (Parker, 2007). 
There was another characteristic of the US Banking system that could lead 
to disaster, which was the lack of a central regulator for the banking institution 
instead there were different regulators for each type of bank. 
National banks were regulated and supervised by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency. Fed member banks (which included all 
national banks and a minority of state-chartered banks) faced additional 
regulation and oversight. But the vast majority of banks were 
nonmember, state-chartered commercial banks, which were supervised 
by state banking departments and regulated by laws passed by state 
legislatures (Mitchener, 1991, p.5). 
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The differences between the supervisors provided different capital 
requirements, reserve requirements, and branching laws. The differences on 
the requirements of national banks and private banks were colossal, and as 
Mitchener (1991) shows, national banks were better prepared. The author found 
four reasons that led to the downward spiral of the banking system during the 
Great Depression: 
First, politics can undermine the stability of banking systems. As a result 
of the privative motives of interest groups and the public response to 
previous banking crisis, some states adopted stricter reserve 
requirements and laws forbidding branch banking, which led to higher 
bank failure rates during the Depression. Second, designing 
supervisory structures to reduce the likelihood of banking crises 
requires taking into account the incentives of both interest groups and 
the regulators themselves. States that attempted to insulate their bank 
superintendents from political influence by lengthening the terms of their 
superintendents exposed themselves to greater influence from bankers 
who recognized that the incentives for influencing supervisory decisions 
were now higher; this had surprising and counterproductive 
consequences during the Depression. Third, giving sufficient powers to 
regulators to carry out their supervisory mandate can increase systemic 
safety. Failure rates, for example, were lower in states where bank 
supervisors had the authority to liquidate banks without the court first 
having to appoint a receiver. Finally, the initial regulatory design can 
induce the formation of interest groups and lock in a regulatory 
trajectory that can have lasting effects. The dual banking system that 
developed in the U.S. in the 19th century nurtured the formation of a set 
of interest groups, which in turn influenced state regulations in the 
1920s. These regulations consequently help to explain the regional 
severity of the U.S. banking crisis during the Great Depression 
(Mitchener, 1991, p.66-67). 
 
The failures of the banking system in the fall of 1930, led to the extinction of 
the few confidence the population had left on the banking system, so runs on 
the banks started. Four waves of banking panics strut all across US and major 
insolvencies began. The four waves of banking panics started in the fall of 
1930, the spring of 1931, the fall of 1931, and the fall of 1932. The momentum 
was only stopped when on March 6, 1933 Roosevelt declared a national “bank 
holiday” (Romer, 2003).   
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) believe the first wave started in December of 
1930, with the failure of the Bank of the US. Friedman and Schwartz continued 
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by dividing the crisis in 6 moments: (1) The period prior to the first banking 
panic – That is, August 1929 to October 1930. This period encompassed the 
stock market crash in October 1929 to which the Fed responded by short-lived 
increase in the quantity of money. Subsequently, an earlier decline in the 
quantity of money was resumed, but there was no attempt by banks to liquidate 
loans or by depositors to shift from deposits to currency. During this interval, the 
contraction would have been defined as severe relative to earlier ones. (2) The 
first banking panic, covering the final quarter of 1930, when the real economy 
markedly worsened. (3) The first quarter of 1931, when signs of revival were 
nipped upon the onset of a second banking crisis in March 1931. (4) The last 
half of 1931, when the response of the Fed to Britain’s departure from gold was 
accompanied by another outbreak of banking panic and a substantial 
deepening of the real decline that persisted through the first quarter of 1932. (5) 
The second quarter of 1932, when the Fed undertook open-market purchases, 
following which there was a widespread revival in the real economy in the 
summer and fall. (6) The final six months of the contraction, when the problems 
with the banks spread, the real economy turned downward again, and the 
contraction ended with a collapse of financial markets. 
 
Illustration 7: Open Market Operations, 1920 - 1940 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Monetary & fiscal stat comparisons 1929 and now”, by A world of 
possible futures (n.d.) 
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According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963) the banking panics could be 
avoided by restricting payments, like they did in 1893 and 1907, which ended 
the bank suspensions and promoted economic recovery. When banks acted 
together to restrict payments, it devaluated deposits against currency. Deposit 
prices started being determined by supply and demand. In 1903 and 1907, the 
currency premium never passed from 4 percent. 
The banking failures led to an increase in banking reserves and an increase 
demand of currency, which eventually contracted Aggregate Demand. The runs 
on the banks were affecting the aggregate demand even more which was 
already seriously affected. The Fed didn’t realize it was its job to provide 
liquidity to these banks at least until the panics eased up. The lack of money 
supply was causing banks to decline credit they would otherwise grant 
(Friedman & Schwartz, 1963). 
 
Illustration 8: Financial Shocks and inflation during the Great Depression 
 
Source: Adapted from “A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960”, by M. 
Friedman and A. Schwartz, 1963, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Copyright 1963 
by National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) believe Fed’s inaction is strongly correlated 
with the death of Benjamin Strong in 1928. Benjamin Strong was the president 
of the New York’s Fed. He was a doer who believed the right way to go was to 
avoid panics at all costs. When he died, the leaders that took his place didn’t 
follow his advice and through their policies seriously contracted the money 
supply, sending the US further into the Depression.  
The stock market collapse made firms to shift their new offerings from stocks 
to bonds. From 1929 to 1930, net new stock offerings declined by 2.5 billion 
dollars, while on the other hand, new net bonds offerings have risen by 1.4 
billion dollar, the financial markets were shifting. Although in the end of 1930, 
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with the increase in the number of bonds being traded, and with the perceived 
risk increasing due to businesses and banks failing, the price was getting lower 
(Temin, 1994).  
 
2.7 The Gold Standard 
The gold standard, as a fixed exchange rate that traded monetary units by a 
fixed weight of gold, was the instrument that allowed the flow of investments 
and persons all over the world. In the end of the 19th century many countries 
have adopted the gold standard.  The gold standard permitted that saving and 
investing could be guaranteed by the stability of money values. 
The classical gold standard started before World War I and at the time 
everything was working smoothly, without any major crisis. When the World 
War I started, the gold standard had to be suspended with the intention of 
bringing it back as soon as possible. There was no doubt between the 
population and governments that the gold standard was the right way to go. 
To understand the importance of the gold standard at the time, it is important 
to go back to 1918 when the Cunliffe Committee reported to the British 
government regarding the gold standard. The Committee stated as follows: “In 
our opinion it is imperative that after the war the conditions necessary to the 
maintenance of an effective gold standard should be restored without delay.” In 
the same report it is explicit the opinion of the gold standard as being the best 
way to avoid economic instability (Eichengreen & Flandreau, 1997). 
The return of the gold standard was only possible in the mid-1920s, without 
ever realizing that the rules of the game had changed.  The report didn’t 
mention one slight problem that was the restoration that the committee 
expected was the free purchase and sale of gold at prewar parities. Prewar 
parities were completely outdated and the parities didn’t bear in mind the 
existing levels of income and costs in terms of the national currency, 
(Eichengreen & Flandreau, 1997). 
The parities needed to be changed dramatically because after the Great 
War and due to the increase of control in labor markets, unions, personnel 
departments and such, the wages began to lose the flexibility they once had, 
and so the mechanism adjustment of the gold standard was lost. The reluctance 
in reducing the wages led to the fragility and inflexibility of the gold standard 
which in turn led to the Great Depression (Eichegreen & Temin, 1997). 
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With the return of the Gold standard, the same was happening all over 
Europe, the currencies were misadjusted. The pound was overvalued, the franc 
and the marc were undervalued and so on.  
The French realized that to maintain prosperity the French prices should be 
below world prices, this kind of egocentric behavior was putting the gold 
standard in jeopardy as it created huge discrepancies on the value of 
currencies. 
The discrepancies on the value of currencies was creating huge outflows of 
gold on the countries with overvalued currencies (Britain) to the ones with 
undervalued currencies (France), which in time led to disaster (Eichegreen & 
Temin, 1997). 
To decrease gold outflows Britain resorted to a significant increase in 
interest rates. The increase in interest rates decreased the aggregate demand, 
worsening even more the economic conditions in Britain. In September 1931, 
the British economy was decaying rapidly and the solution they encountered 
was to suspend the gold standard. After six months Britain was expanding 
(Kraner, 2010). 
Some historians realized that if countries had resumed the gold standard 
with more realistic parities, there was limited need for the 1920’s deflationary 
adjustments, although wages and prices needed a reduction. If the policy 
makers did that the gold standard could stand, at least for a few more years 
(Eichegreen & Temin, 1997). 
According to Temin (1994) when Britain went off gold, attentions turned to 
US, and according to Temin it was at that stage that the growing depression 
was turned into the Great Depression by the Fed. The same author said the 
Fed’s mistake started when investors thought the dollar was going to take the 
same path as the pound and so they rushed to sell dollars. The solution the Fed 
found to preserve the dollar was to increase interest rates which greatly 
accelerated the decline on money supply. Industrial production, which had 
stopped from falling in the spring of 1931, resumed to fall after the increase in 
interest rates. 
Some economists, like Romer believe that the gold standard collapse was in 
part the cause of the inaction of the Fed, which aggravated and caused the 
Great Depression. 
According to Romer (2003) if the Fed hadn’t tightened the money supply by 
the fall of 1931, US could have experienced a speculative attack on the dollar 
which could have forced the US to abandon the gold standard, at that stage. 
The Fed System reacted vigorously and promptly to the external drain, 
has it had not to the previous internal drain. On October 9, the Reserve 
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Bank of New York raised its rediscount rate to 2 ½ per cent and on 
October 16, to 3 ½ per cent the sharpest rise within so brief a period in 
the whole history of the system, before or since (Friedman & Schwartz, 
1963, p.317). 
 
The US were on a gold standard throughout the Depression. Part of the 
explanation for why the Fed did so little to counter the financial panics 
and economic decline was that it was fighting to defend the gold 
standard and maintain the prevailing Fixed Exchange rate (Romer, 
2009, p.6). 
 
Benham describes the thoughts of most of the economists of that decade. 
The loss of gold or the higher bank rate, then, can restore international 
equilibrium only by reducing internal prices. Of these, the most 
important is the price of labour. Wages and other incomes from labour 
may be reduced. This will have double effect. On the one hand, wage 
earners and others will have less to spend on everything, including 
imports. On the other hand costs will be reduced in all industries, 
including export industries. Imports will be checked and exports 
stimulated until the two flows once more balance (Benham, 1932, 
p.250). 
 
The Great Depression started as soon as the policies to preserve the gold 
standard were adopted. Policies were designed to preserve the gold standard 
and not employment. While bankers thought that the maintenance was going to 
save employment on the long run, when banks started to fail there were major 
output and price losses as well as saving losses. The huge increase on 
unemployment was making US more and more reluctant on keeping the gold 
standard. 
According to Eichegreen & Temin (1997), the major mistake committed by 
the Fed and the Bank of England was that they didn’t follow the gold standard 
mentality. Instead, they sterilized gold inflows which prevented prices and costs 
from adjusting. Central banks panicked to the point of reducing the share of 
foreign exchange in global monetary reserves from 37 per cent in 1928 to 11 
per cent in 1931. Central banks wanted to preserve their gold reserves at all 
cost. 
The rush on the gold only made the banks to restrict the credit, which 
depressed prices, production and employment (Eichegreen & Temin, 1997). 
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Deflation led to a spiral which greatly reduced consumption due to the 
increase in the real debts of the population.  
Despite the fact the economy was collapsing due to deflation, Hoover 
maintained deflation politics when he was in charge. When Roosevelt won 
elections, Hoover tried to convince him the best way he can that the gold 
standard was the salvation of the economy. Even two decades after US left gold 
standard, Hoover maintained his posture of assuming it was the right way to go 
(Eichengreen & Temin, 2000). 
Fortunately, Hoover’s warnings didn’t reach Roosevelt and when he was 
elected in November 1932, it took him only 4 months to abandon the gold 
standard. In the same year Roosevelt participated in the World Economic 
Conference in July, in his words it is well documented what he thought of the 
gold standard: 
The world will not long be lulled by the specious fallacy of achieving a 
temporary and probably an artificial stability in foreign exchange on the 
part of a few large countries only” He continued “The sound internal 
economic situation of a nation is a greater factor in its well-being that 
the price of its currency (Nixon, 1969 apud Eichengreen & Temin, 1997, 
p.269). 
 
2.8 What ended the Great Depression? 
The end of the Great Depression was caused by a number of facts. It is 
impossible to specify a single act that led to the end of The Great Depression. 
Although the most important fact regarded by most economists is without a 
doubt World War II. 
There are many economists like Lucas, Zarkowitz, Abramovitz, Adelman, 
that will simply put it that it was World War II that ended the Great Depression. 
There are others that are more specific in describing the facts that ended the 
Great Depression. We have Samuelson’s opinion, who believes the end of 
Great Depression was caused by the “Golden Avalanche”. The “Golden 
Avalanche” started in 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt relinquished the gold 
standard. When US got off the gold standard it was freed from the deflationary 
vortex they were in. The World War II created an inflow of gold reserves, so 
there wouldn’t be a shortage on gold (Parker, 2002). 
In 1933 Keynes explained to Roosevelt with very precise figures that he 
needed to spend much more in deficit spending, and although Samuelson 
doesn’t agree on how Keynes did it (with that amount of confidence with his 
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numbers), he agrees with the part that it was ideal and salutary to increase the 
total depression budget deficit (as cited in Parker, 2002, p.34).  
Samuelson remembers that because USA “…was down so low, and once 
the recovery was pushed by this unorthodox spending (World War II), the 
annual increases in GDP in real terms and in the money supply, were colossal” 
(as cited in Parker, 2002, p.35). 
Friedman believes the Great Depression has ended by a series of factors. 
First of all, the start of World War II and government spending for armament, 
that was financed by printing money which led to an increase of the money 
supply. Friedman also gives great importance to the measures that Roosevelt 
took. Among them, the bank holiday, the going off gold, the program to 
purchase gold and the silver purchase program (as cited in Parker, 2002). 
  
Albert Hart believes the end of the Great Depression was mainly due to the 
start of World War II. The credibility of banks was restored once they started to 
guarantee their banking deposits which adverted the rush on banks. Hart also 
believes the New Deal improved the falling of the economy in a way, but not a 
significant one. Instead of having a recession US ended up with stagnation with 
the teachings of the new dealers (as cited in Parker, 2002). 
Kindleberg also thinks that the War was the lifeboat of the Great Depression. 
Regarding the role that fiscal and monetary policy might have in the end of The 
Great Depression Kindleberg’s opinion is that “Fiscal policy could do it but it is a 
hard policy to play”, regarding the monetary policy he reminds that the short 
term of interest rate got down to negative values, but that wasn’t the problem, 
the problem was the lack of a spending boom or durable goods production (as 
cited in Parker, 2002, p.101). 
Schwartz believes it was Roosevelt’s actions (closing the banks, devaluation 
of the dollar) that ended the Great Depression. Roosevelt’s actions inspired 
people to react. In 1936, people realized that Roosevelt wasn’t the savior they 
once thought because in 1934 US was in a liquidity trap. Schwartz also believes 
that Roosevelt should have done like the Japanese when they increased money 
supply, even though they had interest rates close to zero. Kindleberg isn’t a big 
supporter of Roosevelt, in his opinion, Roosevelt was trying one thing after 
another till he got it right. Kindleberg characterizes Roosevelt attacks on the 
World Economic Conference of 1933 “…as an awkward economic analysis.” He 
also thinks that NRA (National Recovery Administration) was a mistake (as 
cited in Parker, 2002). 
Tobin considers there are two important moments which led to the end of 
the Great Depression. The first was until 1938 with the confidence restored, 
Roosevelt opening the banks, and the devaluation of the dollar. The second 
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moment he believes, like many other economists, that it was World War II that 
ultimately freed US from the Great Depression with the aid supplied to the allied 
forces. Tobin believes the New Deal didn’t have that much influence in the 
recovery, although he supports their work on the relief programs like the WPA 
(Work Projects Administration) and the financial reforms. As for the NRA and 
the AAA (Agricultural Adjustment Administration) they were really bad ideas (as 
cited in Parker, 2002). 
Stein believes the Great Depression ended when monetary stringency 
stopped, and when US abandoned the gold standard, in summary when the 
fiscal policy changed. Although, in the end he points out that the War had the 
biggest role on ending it (as cited in Parker, 2002). 
Temin (apud Parker, 2007) points out two factors, first was going off the gold 
standard, and the second and more important one had to be the beginning of 
World War II. Temin thought the role of Roosevelt on the recuperation of the 
economy was a bright one. Roosevelt changed the expectations of the 
population, he left the gold standard and changed the regime drastically which 
led to an increase of confidence among the population. According to Temin 
abandoning the gold standard was one of the most important steps that 
Roosevelt took, because the problem of the gold standard was: 
Calling for lower wages is the discourse of the standard because this 
call follows from the mechanics of the monetary system. Countries on 
the gold standard cannot devalue their currencies and allow the 
demand for exports to determine their exchange rate. They cannot 
expand the money supply to stimulate domestic demand, for doing so 
would push up prices, provoke gold exports, and weaken the exchange 
rate. For them, the only way to reduce prices is to reduce costs of 
production, and the largest of these costs is labor (as cited in Parker, 
2007, p.45). 
 
The problem was that Unions were reluctant to lower wages, and ultimately 
this led to the instability of the gold standard. 
The end of the Great Depression started when the gold standard was 
removed and the banking system was stabilized by the banking holiday, these 
were the two main impediments to the recovery according to Bernanke (as cited 
in Parker, 2007). 
As cited in Parker (2007), when asked what got US out of the Great 
Depression Hamilton points out getting off the gold standard linked with the 
monetary and fiscal stimulus of World War II. 
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Regarding the end of the Great Depression, Ohanian attributes an 
enormous role to the reversal of Roosevelt’s labor and industrial policies. There 
was a decrease on the bargaining power of Unions as well. In summary what 
ended the Great Depression was the end of the New Deal policies and the 
World War II expansion (as cited in Parker, 2007). 
In the end it was the monetary expansion that ended the Great Depression 
as Romer stresses out. “…people may have missed the crucial role of monetary 
expansion because the nominal interest rate was already near zero before the 
start of the recovery. In this situation, it looks as though further monetary 
expansion could not have done anything. But, expansionary monetary policy 
can cause expectations of inflation.”  (as cited in Parker, 2007, p.136). It was an 
interest-sensitive spending, that led to the recovery. The consumption of 
services just continued to go down but the consumption of durables just rose. 
Eichengreen reported that the Great Depression ended with the abandoning 
of the gold standard which led to a stabilization of prices and financial systems. 
The political change in the government solved the downward trend (as cited in 
Parker, 2007). 
As cited in Parker (2007), Cecchetti said it was World War II that ended the 
Great Depression, and if it wasn’t for the War, the economy could have taken a 
better path if reserve requirements didn’t exist. 
Butkiewicz believes that what ended the Great Depression was World War 
II, and in a minor extent the gold inflows and the monetary expansions. He also 
believes that the RFC (Reconstruction Finance Corporation) and the FDCI 
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) were one of the causes for the slow 
pace of the recovery (as cited in Parker, 2007). 
Bordo thinks there were a series of events that led to the end of the Great 
Depression. It started with the election of Roosevelt and the change in policies, 
the bank holiday, the devaluation of the dollar, the following of expansionary 
gold policy by the Treasury and the change in Fed’s policies regarding open 
market operations. World War II was important because it led to gold flows that 
allowed the expansionary gold policy of the Treasury (as cited in Parker, 2007). 
As cited in Parker (2007), Calomiris reminds that there are at least two 
stages on the recovery of the Great Depression. The first one started in March 
1933 when Roosevelt left the gold standard which led to an increase of the 
industrial production. The second one was in 1939 with the start of the World 
War II. 
When asked what ended the Great Depression Meltzer points out the gold 
inflows and World War II. In 1936 the money growth was very high so the 
economy was almost at 1929’s level, but in 1937 the Treasury and the Fed 
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agreed to sterilize gold inflows slowing the recovery. In the end it was World 
War II that finished the cycle of recovery (as cited in Parker, 2007). 
The most important and most regarded factor that led to the end of the Great 
Depression is in fact the start of World War II. 
 
2.9 What are the lessons we should take from the Great 
Depression? 
The lessons US has learned from the Great Depression should prevent it 
from taking the same path as before.  
Every economist will explain that there are a series of lessons that we took 
and that we should take from the Great Depression.  
A great example of that goes to Friedman. Friedman shows that the lesson 
we should take from the Great Depression, is that the government just failed 
with the mismanagement of the monetary system. The lesson people took from 
it was you couldn’t count on capitalism for itself, you need the intervention of the 
government to complete it (as cited in Parker, 2002). 
Abramovitz thinks the lesson US should take is to be careful with bubble 
economies, while Kindleberger goes further naming the solution to try and avoid 
bubbles, that solution starts by a rationalization of loans to speculators( like 
margin requirements applied to futures) (as cited in Parker, 2002). 
Hart remembers that the World is bigger than the US. Hart and Bordo also 
focus their opinions towards central banks. They believe that the lesson US 
should take is to keep an eye on banking regulations so banking panics could 
be avoided above all. Kindleberger also addresses the central banks question 
reminding that the role of the lender of last resort has to be accomplished 
(Parker, 2002). 
Some economists emphasize the price stabilization question, among them 
we have Kindleberger, Calomiris and Bernanke. Although Kindleberger focus 
mainly on interest rates prices, and the mistake of trying to lower them in one 
country while other linked to it is trying to raise them. Regarding the last part, 
Kindleberg states “If you have one market, there can only be one price. But if 
you have two markets that are joined with a market in between, you only have 
one price. Try to make two prices and you get into trouble.” (as cited in Parker, 
2002, p.102). As cited by the same author, Bernanke addresses to the 
stabilization of prizes in a different context. Bernanke remembers that if there 
was a price target of inflation/deflation, US would be obliged to abandon the 
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gold standard, and the Depression would be somewhat controlled. Calomiris 
believes the price stabilization is necessary, because after all it was government 
policies that were pushing the inflation higher. 
On the other side of price stabilization we have Tobin. As cited in Parker 
(2002) Tobin defends people shouldn’t give that much emphasis on prices. 
People should pay attention to quantities more than prices. In these matters 
Tobin states: 
The biggest thing then that I think is that instantaneous market clearing, 
continuous equilibrium in that sense, supply equals demand and prices 
move all the time to adapt to whatever shifts in the curves occur, that is 
not a good way of going about macroeconomics in my opinion (p.138). 
 
There are others also that point to the inflation/deflation lesson in a more 
general way. We have Stein, Bordo and Meltzer to support this idea. Stein says 
that the lesson we should keep in mind is “We have serious depressions in this 
country only after serious inflation” (as cited in Parker, 2002, p. 178). Bordo on 
the other hand believes the deflation problem has been learned too well, he 
believes that now the Fed can’t distinguish the deflations that are related to 
productivity advances to the ones that are not. Meltzer points in a different 
direction, he believes that because now the Fed has inflation targeting, they are 
obliged to have a medium term horizon, from 2 to 3 years, avoiding major 
discrepancies. (as cited in Parker, 2007). Meltzer makes this remark because 
he believes the Fed is dealing with problems in a day to day basis, while they 
should focus on a medium term strategy. A good way to show what he means 
by short term basis can be seen on the weight the Fed puts on short interest 
rate movements, although today it has nothing to do with 1929 (as cited in 
Parker, 2007). 
The lessons learned by the government are well addressed by many 
economists. One of them is Romer who starts by saying that the government is 
not powerless to stop a major depression and Eichengreen that suggests that 
the fundamental lessons we should take from the Great Depression are: 
introducing a coherent policy framework, which requires the independence of 
the central bank, a clear objective and a clear identification of policy channels 
and how it affects the economy. On the same line of thought we have Adelman 
who remembers that accidents happen, and the government should be ready to 
stop them from propagating (as cited in Parker (2007a) e Parker (2002b)). 
Schwartz thinks the government and the Fed realized that a contraction of 
money can’t continue without taking measures, nor can they let an expansion of 
the money stock above the real growth rate of the economy. An overview of 
what Schwartz means can be observed during the Great Depression when 
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businessmen were trying to keep the wages, because they believed if wages 
got lower so would the purchasing power, what they didn’t realize was that 
sales were still dropping (as cited in Parker, 2002). 
Hamilton believes there are some answers that sill remain unsorted. The 
answer that Hamilton believes it still remains unsorted is what was exactly “… 
the nature of the transaction frictions or coordination frictions that are the core 
of what can go so spectacularly wrong” (as cited in Parker, 2007, p.84).  
 
2.10 Could it happen again? 
There is a consensus in the profession when this question is asked. The 
majority of economists will simply answer that it is very unlikely that it would 
happen again. 
As cited in Parker (2002) the only differences are related on why they say it 
won’t happen again. Samuelson believes US would act accordingly if something 
similar was about to happen: “If it is just shortage of purchasing power, our 
mores have changed, our knowledge has changed, and money would be 
printed and borrowings would take place…” (p.37). However Samuelson 
defends that an overstimulation could be possible, that would lead to inflation. 
There is no constancy of the velocity of circulation. Friedman also addresses to 
the inflation problem, “Another Depression like that will not happen until first we 
have a great inflation. We’re always fighting the last war” (p.55).  
US has learned its mistakes during the Great Depression, and today no 
central bank will let the money supply go down like it did, as long as that stands, 
we will not have another Great Depression. Friedman also writes:  “But if you 
once have a great inflation, all bets are off and anything might happen.” (as 
cited in Parker, 2002, p.55).  
Abramovitz focus on the knowledge we have today to avoid something 
similar, as he says “My own sense of the matter is that the severity and length 
of the Great Depression of the 1930’s could not happen again in the economy 
we know today” (as cited in Parker, 2002, p.71). The author also believes it is 
impossible to forecast the future, so we can become more vulnerable to great 
disasters without even knowing. 
Kindleberg believes another Great Depression would be avoided because 
the role of the lender of last resort has been greatly improved. It is possible to 
have crashes, but not another Great Depression (as cited in Parker, 2002). 
Tobin expresses that in US and in a capitalist democracy it is very unlikely it 
could happen again. Tobin is somewhat reluctant when he looks at Europe and 
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Japan who succeeded in having a depression. Lucas also stresses the same 
concern with Japan with its sophisticated economy that managed to plunge in to 
a decade of slow growth due to monetary reasons. Lucas believes it is not right 
to say it couldn’t happen again (as cited in Parker (2002a) and Parker (2007b)). 
Adelman, Zarkowitz and Cechetti think there is a possibility that the Great 
Depression can happen again. But while Adelman says that it’s not likely that 
the same factors that propagated so fast then would propagate at the same rate 
now, and Zarkowitz adverts that downturns are most of the times unexpected, 
Cecchetti believes fiscal policy could take US back to another Great 
Depression. The risk of a high deflation together with a collapse of the economy 
could disrupt the economy. Although, Cecchetti thinks is improbable US could 
have again a 30 percent deflation together with a loss of 30 percent in output, 
now there are mechanisms to avoid that, that lesson has been learned (as cited 
in Parker (2002a, b) and Parker (2007c)). 
 
Temin affirms that there will not be one Great Depression like the one in 
1930, but economic collapses can always occur, and those collapses can be 
generated by people aiming for a different goal than economic stability. At this 
point Temin criticizes Bush’s Administration as a perfect example of that (as 
cited in Parker, 2007). 
Bernanke alerts that there are always risks that will affect the economy, 
should they be monetary, financial, or others, but he also doesn’t believe it 
could happen (as cited in Parker, 2007). 
The reason why Hamilton believes in the impossibility of another Great 
Depression is simply because he considers inconceivable that the Fed would 
allow that kind of deflation again as he states: 
The intellectual and academic tradition in the Fed is such that I can’t 
conceive of them ever again allowing this magnitude of deflation, this 
magnitude of a drop in the monetary aggregates, and while all that is 
going on the economy crashes (as cited in Parker, 2007, p84).  
 
Romer considers the Great Depression has a sequence of mistakes like “… 
contractionary aggregate demand shocks, first coming from the stock market 
crash, then from the financial panics, then we raised taxes, then we raised 
interest rates”. According to the author, today there is a lot of consciousness 
about what and what can’t be done to prevent a Depression like this (as cited in 
Parker, 2007, p.137).  
Eichengreen believes US has learned with the Great Depression as he also 
points out that today US has a great scholar of the Great Depression as 
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chairman of the Fed, who will do the best he can to prevent another episode like 
that. Despite that, Eichengreen believes US still has to be cautious because 
there will always be instability episodes, the question is: Will the policy makers 
be able to detect them on time? (as cited in Parker, 2007). 
Bordo and Butkiewicz believes the reason for the Great Depression not 
happening again is because the US is not committed to the gold standard like it 
was back then, nor do the US adopt the same monetary policy as before (as 
cited in Parker, 2007). 
Hart, Leontief, Shwartz, Stein, Ohanian, Meltzer and Calomiris  believes US 
has learned from its mistakes (as cited in Parker (2002a) and Parker (2007b)). 
 
2.11 Conclusion 
The tables below represent a short summary of the works of Randall E. 
Parker in the books “Reflections on the Great Depression” and “The Economics 
of The Great Depression” based on interviews of distinguished economists. The 
objective of these tables is to identify the mentalities of The Greatest minds in 
Economics of the century, in their own words.  
 
Table 1: Opinions of the Greatest Economists over the Great Depression  
 PAUL 
SAMUELSON 
MILTON 
FRIEDMAN 
MOSES 
ABRAMOVITZ 
ALBERT        
HART 
CHARLES 
KINDLEBERG
ER 
ANNA             
SCHWARTZ 
DATE AND 
PLACE OF 
BIRTH 
1915 
GARY, 
INDIANA 
1912 
BROOKLYN, 
NEW YORK 
1912 
BROOKLYN, 
NEW YORK 
1909 
OAKPARK, 
ILLINOIS 
1919 
NEW YORK 
1915 
NEW YORK 
SCHOLARSHIP CHICAGO CHICAGO HARVARD 
COLUMBIA 
HARVARD 
CHICAGO 
PENNSYLVANI
A 
COLUMBIA 
COLUMBIA 
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CAUSES AND 
START OF THE 
DEPRESSION 
 
HOOVER 
INACTIVISM. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION
. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION
. COLLAPSE IN 
CONSUMPTION
. 
LONG 
SWINGS. 
HOOVER’S 
POLICIES. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTIO
N. STOCK 
MARKET. 
BANKS’ 
LENDING TO 
SPECULATOR
S. 
REAL ESTATE 
BUBBLE. 
PRICE 
INSTABILITY. 
WHY DID IT 
LAST SO 
LONG? 
   PEOPLE 
THOUGHT 
THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION 
WAS SIMILAR 
TO THE 1921 
DEFLATION. 
  
BLAME OF 
THE FED 
NO, THE 
INCREASE IN 
MONEY 
SUPPLY 
WASN’T ON 
THE AGENDA 
OF 
DISCUSSION. 
IT WASN’T 
ACTIVIST 
ENOUGH. 
YES, THEY 
SHOULD HAVE 
A MORE 
EXPANSIONAR
Y MONETARY 
POLICY. 
NO, THEY 
DIDN’T HAVE A 
CHANCE IF 
THEY WANTED 
TO MAINTAIN 
THE GOLD 
STANDARD. 
NO, THEY 
DIDN’T HAVE 
ENOUGH 
INSTRUMENT
ALITIES. 
YES. FED 
FAILED AS 
THE LENDER 
OF LAST 
RESORT.  FED 
WAS 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE 
STOCK 
MARKET 
BUBBLE. 
YES. FED 
FAILED AS THE 
LENDER OF 
LAST RESORT. 
THEY LET 
BANKS FAIL. 
WHAT ENDED 
THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION? 
THE “GOLDEN 
AVALANCHE”, 
CREATED BY 
THE END OF 
THE GOLD 
STANDARD 
AND THE 
START OF 
WORLD WAR 
II. 
THE START OF 
WORLD WAR 
II. 
ROOSEVELT’S 
POLICIES. 
THE START OF 
WORLD WAR 
II. 
THE START 
OF WORLD 
WAR II. 
THE START 
OF WORLD 
WAR II. 
FISCAL AND 
MONETARY 
POLICIES 
CHANGES. 
ROOSEVELT’S 
POLICIES. 
LESSONS 
LEARNED 
THE ROLE OF 
THE LENDER 
OF LAST 
RESORT. 
BEWARE OF 
BUBBLE 
ECONOMIES. 
THE 
GOVERNMENT 
FAILED WITH 
THE 
MISMANAGEM
ENT OF THE 
MONETARY 
SYSTEM. 
WE SHOULD 
BE CAREFUL 
WITH BUBBLE 
ECONOMIES. 
KEEP AN EYE 
ON BANKING 
REGULATION
S. THE 
WORLD IS 
BIGGER 
THAN US. 
THE ROLE OF 
THE LENDER 
OF LAST 
RESORT. 
RATIONALIZA
TION OF 
LOANS TO 
SPECULATOR
S. DIFFERENT 
INTEREST 
RATES 
BETWEEN 
LINKED 
MARKETS 
CENTRAL 
BANKS 
SHOULDN’T BE 
ARBITERS OF 
SECURITY 
PRICES. 
MEASURES 
SHOULD BE 
TAKEN TO 
PREVENT THE 
CONTRACTION 
OF MONEY. 
IT’S WRONG 
TO LET THE 
EXPANSION OF 
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MONEY STOCK 
ABOVE THE 
REAL GROWTH 
RATE OF THE 
ECONOMY. 
COULD IT 
HAPPEN 
AGAIN? 
NO. 
HOWEVER 
THERE COULD 
BE AN 
OVERSTIMULA
TION. THAT 
COULD LEAD 
TO INFLATION 
IT CAN ONLY 
HAPPEN IF 
THERE IS A 
GREAT 
INFLATION. 
IT’S UNLIKELY, 
BUT WE CAN’T 
FORECAST 
THE FUTURE. 
NO, US HAS 
LEARNED 
FROM THEIR 
MISTAKES OF 
THE PAST. 
CRASHES, 
YES. 
ANOTHER 
GREAT 
DEPRESSION, 
NO. 
THE ROLE OF 
THE LENDER 
OF LAST 
RESORT HAS 
BEEN 
GREATLY 
IMPROVED. 
NO, US HAS 
LEARNED 
FROM THEIR 
MISTAKES OF 
THE PAST. 
Source: Adapted from “Reflections on the Great Depression” by R..Parker,2002, 
Northampton, MA, USA : Copyright data by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited and   “The 
Economics of the Great Depression – A Twenty-First Century Look Back at the Economics of 
the Interwar Era” by R..Parker,2007, Northampton, MA, USA : Editora. Copyright data by 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Opinions of the Greatest Economists over the Great Depression (cont.) 
 JAMES      
TOBIN 
WASSILY 
LEONTIEF 
MORRIS 
ADELMAN 
HERBERT    
STEIN 
VICTOR 
ZARNOWITZ 
PETER TEMIN 
DATE AND 
PLACE OF 
BIRTH 
1918 
CHAMPAIGN, 
ILLINOIS 
1905 
RUSSIA 
1917 
NEW YORK 
1916  
DETROIT, 
MICH. 
1919 
POLLAND 
1937 
SCHOLARSHIP HARVARD HARVARD HARVARD CHICAGO CRACOW 
HEIDELBERG 
MIT 
(MASSACHUS
ETTS 
INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY) 
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CAUSES AND 
START OF THE 
DEPRESSION 
 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION 
LAGS 
BETWEEN 
PRODUCTION, 
DEMAND AND 
INVESTMENT 
BANKS 
WEAKNESSES. 
MONETARY 
POLICY 
MISTAKES. 
RANDOM 
SHOCKS 
MONETARY 
POLICY. 
COLLAPSE OF 
CONSUMPTION
. 
LACK OF 
PRICE 
FLEXIBILITY. 
WHY DID IT 
LAST SO 
LONG? 
PEOPLE 
THOUGHT THE 
GREAT 
DEPRESSION 
WAS SIMILAR 
TO THE 1929 
DEFLATION. 
   POLICY 
MISTAKES. 
KEEPING THE 
GOLD 
STANDARD. 
 
BLAME OF 
THE FED 
YES. FED 
FAILED AS THE 
LENDER OF 
LAST RESORT. 
THEY LET 
BANKS FAIL. 
  YES, THEY 
WERE 
RESPONSIBL
E FOR THE 
SPECULATIV
E BUBBLE OF 
THE STOCK 
MARKET. 
NO, IT IS 
UNFAIR AND 
HINDSIGHT TO 
TELL THAT 
THE FED 
SHOULD HAVE 
INCREASED 
THE 
MONETARY 
BASE. 
YES, THEY 
WERE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE 
STOCK 
MARKET 
BUBBLE, FOR 
NOT 
INCREASING 
THE MONEY 
SUPPLY, AND 
FOR 
INCREASING 
INTEREST 
RATES. THEY 
SHOULD HAVE 
LEFT THE 
GOLD 
STANDARD. 
FED THOUGHT 
THEY HAD TO 
PURGE THE 
SYSTEM. 
WHAT ENDED 
THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION? 
THE START OF 
WORLD WAR 
II. 
ROOSEVELT’S 
POLICIES. 
 THE START OF 
WORLD WAR 
II. 
THE START 
OF WORLD 
WAR II. 
THE CHANGE 
IN FISCAL 
POLICIES. 
THE START 
OF WORLD 
WAR II. 
THE START OF 
WORLD WAR 
II. THE END OF 
THE GOLD 
STANDARD. 
ROOSEVELT’S 
POLICIES. 
LESSONS 
LEARNED 
PEOPLE 
SHOULD PAY 
ATTENTION TO 
QUANTITIES 
MORE THAN 
TO PRICES. 
 ACCIDENTS 
HAPPEN, AND 
WE SHOULD 
AVOID THERE 
PROPAGATION
. 
BEWARE OF 
INFLATIONS. 
BEWARE OF 
RESTRICTIVE 
MONETARY 
POLICIES. 
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COULD IT 
HAPPEN 
AGAIN? 
UNLIKELY, 
BUT LOOKING 
AT JAPAN AND 
EUROPE HE IS 
NOT SO 
CERTAIN. 
NO, US HAS 
LEARNED 
FROM THEIR 
MISTAKES OF 
THE PAST. 
IT CAN 
HAPPEN, BUT 
NOT AT THE 
SAME SPEED 
AS BEFORE. 
NO, US HAS 
LEARNED 
FROM THEIR 
MISTAKES OF 
THE PAST. 
IT CAN 
HAPPEN, 
DOWNTURNS 
ARE MOST OF 
THE TIMES 
UNEXPECTED. 
NO, NOT LIKE 
THE ONE IN 
1930. BUT 
ECONOMIC 
COLLAPSES 
CAN ALWAYS 
OCCUR IF THE 
GOVERNMENT 
GOALS ARE 
NOT 
ECONOMIC 
STABILITY. 
Source: Adapted from “Reflections on the Great Depression” by R..Parker,2002, 
Northampton, MA, USA : Copyright data by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited and   “The 
Economics of the Great Depression – A Twenty-First Century Look Back at the Economics of 
the Interwar Era” by R..Parker,2007, Northampton, MA, USA : Editora. Copyright data by 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Opinions of the Greatest Economists over the Great Depression (cont.) 
 
BEN   
BERNANKE 
JAMES 
HAMILTON 
ROBERT     
LUCAS 
LEE      
OHANIAN 
CHRISTINA  
ROMER 
BARRY 
EICHENGREEN 
DATE AND 
PLACE OF 
BIRTH 
1953 
DILLON, 
SOUTH 
CAROLINA 
1954 
1937 
WASHINGTON 
1957 
1958 
ILLINOIS 
1952 
SCHOLARSHIP HARVARD 
MIT 
CALIFORNIA CHICAGO 
ROCHESTER 
CALIFORNIA 
MIT 
YALE 
CAUSES AND 
START OF THE 
DEPRESSION 
 
GOLD 
STANDARD. 
FINANCIAL 
CRISES. 
BANKING 
CRISES. 
EXCHANGE 
RATE CRISES. 
GOLD 
STANDARD. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION
. 
STOCK 
MARKET 
CRASH. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION
. 
DEFLATION. 
PRODUCTION 
COLLAPSE. 
(WHICH LED 
TO 
UNEMPLOYME
NT) 
PRODUCTIVI
TY SHOCKS.  
MONETARY 
CONTRACTI
ON. 
GOLD 
STANDARD. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION
. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION. 
GOLD 
STANDARD. 
FINANCIAL 
STRUCTURES. 
POLICIES 
ADOPTED. 
WHY DID IT 
LAST SO 
LONG? 
GOLD 
STANDARD. 
NIRA. 
LACK OF 
CONFIDENCE 
AND SLOW 
RECOVERY OF 
THE FINANCIAL 
  
LAWS AND 
REGULATION
S WERE 
SLOWING 
PRODUCTIVI
TY. NEW 
DEAL 
POLICIES. 
SOME OF 
ROOSEVELT 
POLICIES, 
NAMELY THE 
NIRA. 
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SYSTEM. 
BLAME OF THE 
FED 
NO, IT IS 
UNFAIR AND 
HINDSIGHT TO 
TELL THAT THE 
FED SHOULD 
HAVE 
INCREASED 
THE 
MONETARY 
BASE. 
YES, THEY 
WERE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR NOT 
INCREASING 
THE MONEY 
SUPPLY. 
  
YES. THEY 
ARE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR NOT 
INCREASING 
THE MONEY 
SUPPLY. 
YES, THEY 
SHOULD 
ENSURE MORE 
CREDIT TO THE 
FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS. 
THEY WERE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE 
BUBBLE TO 
BURST. THEIR 
INACTION 
CAUSED THE 
DEPRESSION. 
WHAT ENDED 
THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION? 
THE END OF 
THE GOLD 
STANDARD. 
THE 
STABILIZATION 
OF THE 
BANKING 
SYSTEM BY 
THE BANKING 
HOLIDAY. 
THE END OF 
THE GOLD 
STANDARD. 
MONETARY 
AND FISCAL 
STIMULUS OF 
WORLD WAR 
II. 
THE START OF 
WORLD WAR 
II. 
ROOSEVELT
’S POLICIES. 
THE END OF 
NEW DEAL 
POLICIES. 
THE 
WEAKENING 
OF UNION 
POWERS. 
THE START 
OF WORLD 
WAR II. 
MONETARY 
EXPANSION. 
CONSUME OF 
DURABLE 
GOODS. 
THE END OF 
THE GOLD 
STANDARD. 
ROOSEVELT’S 
POLICIES. 
LESSONS 
LEARNED 
STABILIZATIO
N OF PRICES. 
BEWARE OF 
THE NATURE 
OF THE 
TRANSACTION 
FRICTIONS OR 
COORDINATIO
N FRICTIONS. 
  
THE 
GOVERNMENT 
IS NOT 
POWERLESS 
TO PREVENT A 
MAJOR 
DEPRESSION. 
A COHERENT 
POLICY 
FRAMEWORK, 
INDEPENDENT 
OF THE 
CENTRAL 
BANK, SHOULD 
BE 
INTRODUCED, 
AS WELL AS A 
CLEAR 
OBJECTIVE 
AND A CLEAR 
IDENTIFICATIO
N OF POLICY 
CHANNELS 
AND HOW IT 
AFFECTS THE 
ECONOMY. 
COULD IT 
HAPPEN 
AGAIN? 
NO, BUT 
THERE ARE 
ALWAYS 
RISKS. 
NO, BECAUSE 
THE FED 
WOULD NEVER 
ALLOW THAT 
KIND OF 
DEFLATION TO 
TAKE PLACE 
AGAIN. 
UNLIKELY, 
BUT LOOKING 
AT JAPAN HE 
IS NOT SO 
CERTAIN. 
NO, US HAS 
LEARNED 
FROM THEIR 
MISTAKES 
OF THE 
PAST. 
NO, BECAUSE 
TODAY THERE 
ARE A LOT OF 
MEANS TO 
PREVENT IT. 
NO, THE FED 
HAS A GREAT 
SCHOLAR OF 
THE 
DEPRESSION 
LEADING IT. 
THE ONLY 
QUESTION HE 
ASKS IS WILL 
THE POLICY 
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MAKERS BE 
ABLE TO 
DETECT 
INSTABILITY 
EPISODES ON 
TIME? 
Source: Adapted from “Reflections on the Great Depression” by R..Parker,2002, 
Northampton, MA, USA : Copyright data by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited and   “The 
Economics of the Great Depression – A Twenty-First Century Look Back at the Economics of 
the Interwar Era” by R..Parker,2007, Northampton, MA, USA : Editora. Copyright data by 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited  
 
 
Table 4: Opinions of the Greatest Economists over the Great Depression (cont.) 
 
STEPHEN 
CECCHETTI 
JAMES 
BUTKIEWICZ 
MICHAEL  BORDO 
CHARLES 
CALOMIRIS 
ALLAN       
MELTZER 
DATE AND 
PLACE OF 
BIRTH 
1956   1957 
1928  
MASSACHUSETT
S 
SCHOLARSHIP CALIFORNIA VIRGINIA CHICAGO STANFORD CALIFORNIA 
CAUSES AND 
START OF THE 
DEPRESSION 
 
STOCK MARKET 
CRASH. 
REAL ESTATE 
MARKET CRASH. 
REAL ESTATE 
BUBBLE. 
MONETARY 
POLICIES. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION. 
SHOCKS. 
REAL BILLS 
DOCTRINE. 
MONETARY 
CONTRACTION. 
WHY DID IT 
LAST SO 
LONG? 
THEY THOUGHT 
THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION WAS 
SIMILAR TO THE 
1921 DEFLATION.  
    
BLAME OF 
THE FED 
YES, THEY WERE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE 
FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM. 
YES, THEY WERE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE 
FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM. 
YES, THEY WERE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE 
FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM. THEY 
COULD HAVE 
SUSPENDED THE 
GOLD STANDARD.  
YES, THEY WERE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE 
FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM. 
YES, THEY 
WERE 
RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE 
COLLAPSE OF 
THE FINANCIAL 
SYSTEM. 
WHAT ENDED 
THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION? 
THE START OF 
WORLD WAR II. 
IF THERE WERE 
NO RESERVE 
REQUIREMENTS 
THE ECONOMY 
COULD HAVE 
DONE BETTER. 
THE START OF 
WORLD WAR II. 
MONETARY 
EXPANSION AND 
GOLD INFLOWS. 
ROOSEVELT’S 
POLICIES. THE 
CHANGE IN FED’S 
POLICIES. THE 
START OF WORLD 
WAR II. 
THE END OF THE 
GOLD STANDARD. 
ROOSEVELT’S 
POLICIES. THE 
START OF WORLD 
WAR II. 
GOLD INFLOWS. 
 THE START OF 
WORLD WAR II. 
LESSONS 
LEARNED 
  
BANKING PANICS 
SHOULD BE 
AVOIDED ABOVE 
ALL. THE 
DEFLATION 
PROBLEM. 
PRICE STABILITY.  
THE FED 
DOESN’T PUT 
MUCH WEIGHT 
ON SHORT TERM 
INTEREST RATE 
MOVEMENTS, 
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COMPARED WITH 
1929. FED’S 
INFLATION 
TARGETING 
OBLIGES THEM 
TO HAVE A 
MEDIUM TERM 
HORIZON, FROM 
2 TO 3 YEARS. 
 
COULD IT 
HAPPEN 
AGAIN? IT IS POSSIBLE. 
FISCAL POLICY 
COULD TAKE US 
BACK TO 
ANOTHER GREAT 
DEPRESSION 
NO, BECAUSE US 
DOESN’T ADOPT 
THE SAME 
MONETARY 
POLICIES, AND IT 
IS NOT 
COMMITTED TO 
THE GOLD 
STANDARD LIKE IT 
WAS BACK THEN. 
NO, BECAUSE US 
DOESN’T ADOPT 
THE SAME 
MONETARY 
POLICIES, AND IT 
IS NOT 
COMMITTED TO 
THE GOLD 
STANDARD LIKE IT 
WAS BACK THEN. 
NO, US HAS 
LEARNED FROM 
THEIR MISTAKES 
OF THE PAST. 
NO, US HAS 
LEARNED FROM 
THEIR MISTAKES 
OF THE PAST. 
Source: Adapted from “Reflections on the Great Depression” by R..Parker,2002, 
Northampton, MA, USA : Copyright data by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited and   “The 
Economics of the Great Depression – A Twenty-First Century Look Back at the Economics of 
the Interwar Era” by R..Parker,2007, Northampton, MA, USA : Editora. Copyright data by 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited  
 
The various economists analyzed above have very different backgrounds, 
their scholarship is very diverse, but there is a consensus in a various number 
of answers.  
There are two types of schools roughly represented in the table, the 
“saltwater” economists and the “freshwater” economists. Economists call 
“saltwater economics” to the teachings of the Universities near the Ocean like 
Columbia, MIT(Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Harvard or Berkeley, 
the “freshwater economics” are represented by the teachings of the universities 
nearest to the big lakes like Carnegie Mellon, Chicago or Minnesota. The main 
difference in their ideologies regards the way the government should act in their 
economy (Scheplick, 2012).  
The period right before the Great Depression was of great expansion. This 
great expansion was caused mainly by World War I, then US was the main 
supplier of the Allies, and because it didn’t have an active role on the War it 
could save to expand and to develop. US passed from a large debtor to a 
situation where it was a large creditor. 
  There was a frenzy of new technologies that were securing a great 
improvement in the standard of living of all American families. The 1920’s 
decade was so full of innovations and novelties that it was called the “Roaring 
49 
 
Twenties”. Even US Labor Market was living great changes. Before, the 
Agriculture was predominant, but in the 1920’s, it was becoming more industrial, 
more productive and more capital intensive.    
These kinds of changes had to be supported by an increase in consumption, 
and in turn the consumption had to be financed somehow. 
Families wanted the opportunity to live their “American Dream”, to have a 
house, a car, and if they could they wanted to have access to all the new 
gadgets available. They wanted to “keep up with the Joneses”. 
Well, it was not so hard for them to reach their goals because banks had to 
keep up with the times and so they created the means for families to secure 
their dreams, even if that meant their financial effort would be over the top. 
There was easy credit, and there was almost no regulation. The credit granted 
could be used for whatever means necessary, even for speculation. That is how 
the bubbles started to emerge. Houses were appreciating at an incredible rate, 
and so the families would buy them for speculation because they knew they 
would appreciate in value each year that passed. Banks had the same feeling 
so the collaterals on mortgages were households which created a bigger 
distortion due to the speculative prices of this market.  
Due to the increase in credit the stock market was also increasing 
spectacularly well, it was such an increase that a few families wanted also a 
piece of the stock market profits. Some families started investing on the stock 
market with money they borrowed from banks, for all they cared it was a sure 
investment. The bubble that was being formed on the stock market was 
increasing at a formidable speed. 
The economy was expanding quickly, and there was a belief that it would 
never drop again. 
It was only in 1928-1929 that the Fed realized that the expansion of the 
stock market was being created artificially by easy credit. To fight the expansion 
of the stock market even further the Fed has adopted contractionary policies. 
When the Fed adopted these policies it thought it was only affecting the stock 
market and it wouldn’t create spillovers to the rest of the economy. They were 
wrong. Finally in October of 1929 the stock market bubble burst. The crash 
created a decrease on private wealth of about 10 percent. 
The contractionary policies applied by the Fed together with the crash of the 
stock market decreased significantly the consumption, and the most affected 
goods were the durable goods. Durable goods such as houses, cars, and 
household appliances and so the bubble that was being created around the real 
estate market by years of easy credit burst as well.  
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While only a few were affected by the stock market crash, the crash of the 
real estate market affected almost all American families. Most banks wanted for 
mortgage collaterals households, when families couldn’t afford their mortgages 
banks would keep their houses. The increase on defaults as led banks with a lot 
of houses on their hands. The decreasing demand of houses was lowering their 
prices abruptly and banks were now facing a huge amount of illiquid assets. 
Banks were struggling for liquidity, and so they tried to sell all the houses on 
their portfolios which caused a huge fall on housing prices. Houses were being 
sold at “fire sale” prices.   Some of the banks didn’t resist and started to 
collapse. 
The stock market crash, the real estate market crash and now the collapse 
of the banking system has destroyed the confidence of US population.  
Once again the Fed had its share of guilt. The Fed should have assumed 
the role of “Lender of Last Resort” and started to do some damage control. 
Instead it let some banks to file for bankruptcy obliterating the few confidence 
the population had left on the Banking System. When the first Banks went 
bankrupt the population in a desperate maneuver to prevent them from losing 
everything started to withdraw their deposits. Those bank runs only increased 
even more the number of banks that filed for bankruptcy, creating more panic 
and in turn even more banks went bankrupt.  
US like many other countries had recently rejoined the Gold Standard. The 
Gold Standard as any fixed exchange rate has the ability to magnify things. 
When things work as intended the fixed exchange rate is perfect, but when 
things get sour the fixed exchange rate creates a multiplier effect. During the 
Great Depression it was no different. 
The gold standard was suspended before the World War I, after the war 
there was a great rush to reinstate it again and a number of errors were 
committed. The most important error was to bring back the Gold Standard at 
pre-war parities which were severely misadjusted. With the franc and the marc 
undervalued and the pound overvalued. At this stage US was contracting and 
so it needed gold reserves, France and Germany had undervalued currencies 
and so their gold reserves were increasing and Britain with an overvalued 
pound was losing its gold reserves every day. To protect the outflow of gold 
reserves, Britain was obliged to increase interest rates aggravating even more 
its crisis. In the September 1931 Britain couldn’t stand anymore and left the gold 
standard. When Britain left the gold standard the attentions turned to other 
countries’ currencies. US was seriously affected with Britain’s decisions. 
All could have been prevented, at least for some time, if the currencies had 
returned at the correct parities. Also if countries had worked together, instead of 
acting for their own interests the Gold Standard could have been saved. 
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US commitment to the gold standard as obliged them to defend the currency 
at all cost and contracting even more the economy. The belief of Hoover in 
maintaining the gold standard was supreme, it was only when Roosevelt took 
charge that the gold standard was abandoned. The recovery started, even if it 
was at a slow place, when the gold standard was abolished. The deflationary 
vortex that US was living ended, but still the economy didn’t recover as fast as it 
was expected.  
The consistent deflation of the economy generated a liquidity trap. The 
interest rates were set low to stimulate the economy, but deflation increased 
savings since deflation increases real interest rates. And a vicious cycle started. 
The recession created deflation, deflation increased real interest rates, which 
increased savings and decreased investment which in turn lowered outputs, 
aggravating even more the recession. The monetary policy was now ineffective. 
The real recovery started when World War II started, the production needed 
to fuel the fires of war as created the push US needed to get out of the 
Depression. 
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3 The Great Financial Crisis 
The Great Depression is until now the longest, deepest, broadest and most 
severe depression the world has seen. Although the former is true, the Great 
Financial crisis, also called Subprime crisis, is starting to resemble a bit like the 
old days. The commonalities around the two crises are vast. 
It is well known that there are several things to worry around the current 
crisis like: the biggest job loss since the Great Depression, the worst rise in 
home foreclosures since the Great Depression, the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression. The similarities can also be observed through the 
collapse of financial confidence, as well as the rapid decline of trade and 
industrial activity across the world. The Great Depression analogy simply 
refuses to go away. History more than economic theory is offering a guide on 
inherently unpredictable events, as we can verify in multiple investigations 
(Romer, 2009; Bordo & James, 2009).  
Most economists thought we have learned enough from the Great 
Depression to avoid something similar. They believed the economic cycle was 
solved, but still demand disruption appeared for the first time since the Great 
Depression (Krugman, 2009).  According to Romer (2009, p.1) since the rules 
of the “game” have changed the million dollar question now is “What can we 
learn from the 1930’s that will help us to end the worst recession since the 
Great Depression?”  
Temin (2010) believes Keynes overestimated the ability of people to learn 
from their mistakes, this is true for the Great Depression as well as for the Great 
Recession. 
There are other topics that seriously resemble the Great Depression but now 
with different actors. After the World War I, with the destruction of the most 
powerful European countries US has become their lender. US has assumed the 
position of new world lender. Now, after the Cold War US not only lost is status 
of lender but developed the status of new world borrower, and its biggest lender 
is China a defeated country of the Cold War. Economists knew that this 
situation was unsustainable (Temin, 2010). 
Kraner (2010) believes the financial crisis started in the first quarter of 2006, 
with the burst of the housing market bubble. The main reason for it to happen is 
linked with the easiness on borrowers to get credit even with low credit ratings. 
The subprime mortgages were the most appreciated by borrowers with low 
credit, but when the defaults started to increase abruptly the financial institution 
was shaken.  Although there were attempts by several countries to stop its 
progress, the crisis was already set in motion. 
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3.1 Real Estate Bubble 
In the beginning of this century the conditions have become exceptional for 
a real estate bubble to arise. Credit was extremely easy to obtain, the 
population had the impression the prices of houses would always rise, and 
houses were regarded has a great investment not by the families alone but also 
by banks. Families’ consumption increased exponentially. 
The per capita consumption of US had an average of 1,994 USD (United 
States Dollar) per year over the period of 1980 to 1999, but it suddenly raised to 
almost 2,849 USD per year from 2001 to 2007, now the question is how can this 
increase happen, and how was it financed? (Jagannathan, Kapoor & 
Schaumburg, 2009). 
 
Illustration 9: Private Consumption in US (private consumption and total wages incl. 
benefits (right axis) along with excess consumption calculated as private consumption 
less total wages (left axis). All numbers are in 1980 $ per household). 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Causes of The Great Recession of 2007-9: The Financial Crisis in 
The Symptom Not The Disease” by R. Jagannathan, M. Kapoor and E. Schaumburg, 2009, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, [Working Paper Nº 15404], pp. 14. Copyright 2009 by 
Ravi Jagannathan, Mudit Kapoor and Ernst Schaumburg. 
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What changed? How can the consumption increase if in March –November 
2001 US was in a recession, the S&P 500 was performing badly, and still the 
US households were performing spectacularly well? Spectacularly well here 
means that the houses almost doubled their value from 2000 to 2007, houses 
started to appreciate 15% per year in 2006 against the 5 % from the 1990’s 
(Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
The housing price bubble allowed homebuyers to purchase a house they 
would otherwise consider too expensive, they thought the house prices would 
always go up and in that way they would be compensated by the price 
increases. They never thought the bubble was about to burst (Case & Shiller, 
2004). 
Many economists believed it was a transitory phase and it would all be over 
soon, like it did in the crisis of 1980. Bernanke was one of the economists that 
believed the problems on the subprime sector, mainly on the housing market, 
would be limited to that specific market and spillovers wouldn’t emerge 
throughout the rest of the economy, or to the financial market (Hummel, 2011). 
Case and Shiller (2004), show the real motives for families to buy a house 
and the onset of the bubble. The first motive was that families regarded housing 
as an investment, families regarded future prices instead of the pleasure of 
occupying the home, in this case if the investment motive weakens, the market 
has a tendency to crash. The second motive was related to exaggerated 
expectations, excitement and word of mouth. People thought the future prices of 
homes would increase by more than 10 percent in a year over ten years. The 
third motive was caused by popular theories or stories about speculative price 
movements, here what was worrying was that homeowners did not perceive 
they were in a bubble. The fourth motive was related with popular themes in 
interpreting recent price movements, the most important theme here was low 
interest rates that since 1995 were contributing to the increase in housing 
prices. The fifth motive was related with the stock market boom and bust of 
2003, people thought the refuge for stock market investors would be real estate 
and in a way they were right, it increased even more the prices of houses. The 
sixth motive had to do with houses that were sold above the asked priced in 
some states, people thought they could only charge more than they initially 
asked. The last motive was people’s perception on how to react if the house 
prices suddenly dropped, their initial answer was to wait until the demanded 
price was met, and only in a last resort they would lower the prices. 
These motives were the perfect ingredient for the collapse of the real estate 
market. 
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Illustration 10: Home Values (1890 – nowadays) 
 
Source: Adapted from “Irrational Exuberance” by R. Shiller, 2006, New York: Broadway 
Books. Copyright 2005 by Robert J. Shiller. Retrieved from Randolfe (2006, December 6) 
 
To avoid the recession of 2001 the Fed believed that increasing liquidity was 
the answer, so still in 2000 Fed reduced interest rates, and federal funds 
effective rate were reduced by almost five percent from 2000 to 2004 reaching 
1.35 percent. Federal funds were only adjusted in 2007 to 5.02 percent. The 
rate of mortgages were also adjusted, the 1st year adjustable rate mortgage fell 
from 6.93 percent in 2000 to 3.2 percent in 2003 and it similarly of what 
happened with federal funds, mortgage rates were only adjusted in 2007 to 5.51 
percent. (Kraner, 2010). 
These adjustments are linked with the nomination of Ben Bernanke as 
chairman of the Fed Board in 1 of February of 2006. It was right before the 
crisis began. In the fall of 2007 the subprime mortgages were already a serious 
problem to the economy, the defaults on mortgages were causing serious 
systemic effects. It took too long for the Fed to realize the economy needed an 
adjustment. 
So, the rise in interest rates in 2007 was the cause of so many mortgage 
defaults. Mortgages with adjustable rates were seriously penalized, since there 
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was a huge rise in interest costs. Subprime borrowers were penalized just as 
much since the defaults caused illiquidity (Kraner, 2010). 
 
3.2 Consumption Versus Debt 
In the beginning of the 21st century the leverage of consumption was off the 
charts. This is well shown, if we compare wages with consumption, or else how 
could the large increase in consumption be explained if the wages in the last 
decade had only a slight increase? The ratio of debt to wages was in its all-time 
record when it doubled from 0.6 to 1.2 with most of its increase in the period of 
2000 to 2007 (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
Even though wages/salaries were falling, that didn’t stop families from 
increasing consumption. The consumption continued to increase since families 
felt wealthier, the increase in asset values, securities and real estate prices 
made them feel this way. The average US citizen only felt the actual drop in 
salaries and wages when the Dow Jones dropped in 2007 showing that there 
was a limit to the gains of the stock market. With the loss of the stock market, 
the asset prices also dropped, families felt for the first time in a decade that they 
had to moderate their consumption and increase their savings (Schlenkhoff, 
2009). 
To understand what led people to react like they did, Friedman developed 
his theory of consumption back in 1957. His theory studies the relationship 
between consumption and long-term income expectations. The theory rejects 
the hypothesis of changes in consumption patterns due to short term changes 
in income. On the other hand, the theory attributes great importance in the 
propensity to consume when there is a change in the value of consumer assets, 
it doesn’t matter if they are physical such as securities or property and human 
such as education and experience (Schlenkhoff, 2009). 
Jagannnathan et al (2009) used the income hypothesis to explain how the 
increase in real estate wealth would alter the consumption patterns. What he 
realized was that real estate was seriously leveraged and when there was an 
increase of 1 USD in the value of real estate the consumption would increase 
by 8.4 USD, while other financial assets would have no effect on consumption. 
The overconfidence on highly appreciated home values increased 
substantially the consumption, which in turn increased the current account 
deficit. To even the account balance foreign capitals were being directly injected 
into home mortgages increasing even more house prices, this tendency took a 
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while until finally the market realized it wasn’t a sustainable model 
(Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
3.3 Financial Institutions and Financial Engineering 
Although families have their share of guilt for being irresponsible to the point 
where they reached a level of debt they could never afford, other institutions 
also have their share of guilt. Financial institutions, rating agencies, government 
sponsored enterprises and such were equally or even more responsible for the 
crisis US and the rest of the world has been living. The easiness and 
complacency of these institutions have created an ambience were families have 
become irrational to the point where they didn’t even bother thinking on how 
they were supposed to pay the debts they were contracting. Together with the 
government and the market regulators inaction, it was created the perfect set 
for another economic collapse (Kraner, 2010). 
The first phase of the economic collapse was somewhat unpredictable since 
it started in a small segment of the U.S. financial system, that sector was the 
subprime residential mortgages.  In this first phase, which lasted from August 
2007 to August 2008, there was little change in financial markets, and although 
a mild recession was predicted real GDP continued to rise until the second 
quarter of 2008. The Congressional Budget Office in one of its budget and 
economic outlooks defined the recession as a previous mild recession and that 
unemployment would only rise modestly from 5.4 percent in 2008 to 6.2 percent 
in 2009, they also believed the GDP would continue to grow at a shy rate in 
2008 and in 2009 things would go back to normal. The second phase started in 
September 2008, at this time the crisis was getting critical, the Lehman Brothers 
declared bankruptcy on September 15, the AIG (American International Group) 
insurance firm collapsed the day after, on the same day the Reserve Primary 
Fund monetary market was overrun, and alongside with what was happening 
still the government wanted to pass the TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) 
(Mishkin, 2010). 
The crisis started in the subprime real estate residential mortgages because 
US current account deficits were reaching record levels, with more and more 
foreign savings willing to buy US’s debt. The preferred type of financial 
instrument was fixed income markets which lowered yields on Treasuries. With 
the lowering of Treasury yields, investors were looking for a more profitable 
instrument, so they focused on higher yields and lower risk alternatives, 
especially MBS (Mortgage Backed Securities). With the excess in demand of 
lower risk investments, financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage had to keep 
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up with the times, and so the securitized banking system (shadow banking 
system) was created (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
The Shadow Banking system included all sorts of financial institutions such 
as investment banks, insurance companies and managed funds which included 
hedge funds, SIV’s (Structured Investment Vehicles), money market funds, 
ABCP (Asset-backed Commercial Paper) and others. This type of institutions 
operated in a way that seriously leveraged and brought even more risk to the 
economy. The way these institutions could get around regulatory requirements 
was by using credit risk transfer mechanisms (Kraner, 2010). 
 
Illustration 11: Shadow Bank Liabilities vs. Traditional Bank Liabilities, $ trillion 
 
Source: Retrieved from “What Has – and Has Not – Been Learned about Monetary Policy in 
a Low Inflation Environment? A Review of the 2000s.” by R. Carida, 2010, Paper presented at 
the Boston Federal Reserve Bank  
 
The most common set of tools these institutions used were mortgages. This 
type of tool aided them to create diversified pools of assets, because mortgages 
could be financed by short term debt and sold to investors. Although the 
speculation derived by those institutions was destroying the economy there was 
one factor that would help them leverage even more the economy. Assets with 
high demand could be rehypothecated with low margin requirements due to the 
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low risk of the underlying assets. This kind of behavior was fueling even more 
the real estate market prices (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
 
3.4 Securitization of mortage backed up by Rating Agencies 
The overconfidence lived by the housing market was very present at the 
time, since US didn’t have a nationwide collapse off the housing prices since 
the Great Depression. That feeling and the diversification logic of rating 
agencies permitted the creation of risk-free assets which were generated by 
tranching pools of risky individual mortgages creating “private label” ABS (Asset 
Backed Securities) (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
According to Kraner (2010) this type of security changed completely how the 
system operated. Before this change in housing markets, a person who wanted 
to buy a house would usually recur to a mortgage originator to apply for a loan. 
The mortgage originator would ask for the person to provide financial 
information and to pay an application fee. With the information of the costumer 
the mortgage originator extracts two variables which will allow him to check the 
risk of the applicant. These two variables are the PTI (Payment-to-income) ratio 
and the LTV (Loan-to value) ratio. Once the loan is approved by the mortgage 
originator, he sends a letter of commitment to the applicant showing the various 
types of mortgages the applicant could choose: 
 Prime  
o FMR’s (Fixed rate mortgages) – the borrower repays interest 
and principal in equal installments; 
o ARM’s (Adjustable rate mortgages) – interest rate is linked to 
an index that reflects short-term market rates; 
o Hybrids – combination of the previous two. (Most Common 
type of mortgages and they present this kind of configuration 
2/28 or 3/27 with the first indicating the years the mortgage 
rate remains fixed, and the second number indicates the years 
were the mortgage interest rate will be floating.) 
 
 Non-Prime 
o Subprime Loans – the credit score of the borrower is low and 
so the rate is much higher than for prime loans; 
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o Alt-A loans – riskier than prime loans but less risky than 
subprime loans, they are mortgages who lack the criteria to be 
qualified by government sponsored enterprises;  
o HEL (Home equity loan) or HELOC (Home equity of credit) – 
second-lien loan. 
 
Before the mortgages could be transformed in ABS, the mortgage originator 
had two options: hold the mortgage in his portfolio or sell the mortgage to an 
investor. With the ABS the mortgage originator faced two other options: keep 
the mortgages as collateral for the issuance of a security or sell the mortgage to 
an investor that will place the mortgage in a pool of mortgages that in turn could 
be used as collateral for the issuance of a security. Washington thought that the 
junction of mortgages creating derivatives was a way to reduce the risk, since 
there was a perception that homeowners would default on mortgages randomly 
and independently (Kraner, 2010; Temin, 2010). 
Combining mortgages into tranches, banks could separate the safe part 
of mortgages from the risky parts without knowing which mortgages 
would be defaulted – just as banks do not know which deposits will be 
withdrawn but can safely assume that only a fraction will be withdrawn 
at any given time (Temin, 2010, p.6). 
 
Because housing prices were rising throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s 
ABS markets had steadily increased, and in the end of 2001 until 2006 this 
market reached a share of around 50%. With the increase in demand of these 
securities the market couldn’t keep up producing the AAA rated securities 
(highest possible rating assigned to the bonds of an issuer by credit rating 
agencies), and so it turned to the more risky mortgages (non-prime) like the 
subprime mortgages, Alt-A and home equity mortgages. The market started to 
erode its standards creating risky securities. Subprime mortgages began to 
flood the market. Most subprime mortgages were hybrid and the fixed interest 
rate was intended to function like a “teaser”, when the fixed exchange rate 
reseted, the rate would go up by a significant amount which would give 
borrowers an incentive to refinance. All was going well as long as houses would 
keep appreciating in value (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
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Illustration 12: Subprime Mortgage Origination – Subprime mortgage volume and % 
of total originations 1994-2007 
 
Source: Retrieved from “By the Numbers”, by CNCB – Boom, Bust & Blame, The Inside 
Story of America’s Economic Crisis (n.d.) 
 
As it is well shown in the upper figure, the housing boom burst in 2007 which 
led to a great extent of mortgage defaults. The idea that defaults would only 
occur randomly and independently has turned out to be false. Has the 
perception of the risk of derivatives invaded investors’ minds, the buying of 
derivatives halted, and credit markets seized up. This was the start of the 
financial crisis (Temin, 2010). 
 
3.5 The Beginning of the Financial Crisis 
The beginning of the financial crisis is often dated to August 7, 2007, it was 
the day when the BNP Paribas (French Global Bank – Banque National de 
Paris) suspended redemption of shares in some of its money market funds. This 
situation was forced by the decline in housing prices, which in turn caused 
mortgage-backed financial securities to start having huge losses. In 2008, these 
losses were of about 500 billion dollars. (Over the cliff) Shadow banking system 
was the “core of what happened” according to Krugman. At one point, the 
shadow banking system expanded in such a way that managed to rival or even 
surpass the conventional banking in importance but nothing was done to avoid 
the financial vulnerability that was emerging (Schlenkhoff, 2009). 
Risk aversion started to spread first within banks and then to the general 
population. The subprime crisis turned investors more wary about their 
decisions and the lack of detailed information on the risks of bank portfolios 
turned the investors to treat all banks as riskier instead of discriminating 
65 
 
between banks. A run on the banks started, although this wasn’t a normal run, 
this time the target was the shadow banking system. The shadow banking 
system recurs to short term liabilities, like repurchase agreements (or repos), 
which in turn are indexed to longer-term assets like mortgage backed securities 
that function as collaterals. The borrower usually asks for collateral bigger than 
the loan on what is called a “haircut”. When mortgage backed securities began 
to fall, there was a climate of uncertainty on how they would evolve, borrowers 
started to take cautions by increasing the so called “haircut”, sometimes they 
could reach 50% or more as it is shown in the table below. The behavior led to 
a deleveraging which in turn led financial institutions to sell off their assets. 
While financial institutions were obliged to sell their assets a loop was created, 
the decline in asset values due to the “fire sale” lowered the collateral’s values 
increasing uncertainty which led to larger increase on “haircuts”, and the loop 
started all over again (Eichengreen, Mody, Nedeljkovic & Sarno, 2009; 
Schlenkhoff, 2009; Mishkin, 2009). 
 
Table 5: Increase in “haircuts” 2007-2008 
Type Guess at 
Share of 
collateral 
Rough 
haircut April 
‘07 
Rough 
haircut 
August ‘08 
Contribution 
to liquidity 
hit 
US Treasury 24.0% 0.25% 3.0% 5.96% 
Investment grade 
bonds 
17.1% 1.5% 10.0% 12.38% 
High Yield 4.1% 12.5% 32.5% 5.37% 
Investment grade 
CDS (Credit 
Default Swap) 
3.4% 1.0% 5.0% 1.21% 
Senior leveraged 
loans 
3.4% 11.0% 17.5% 1.66% 
Mezzanine 
leveraged loans 
0.7% 21.5% 35.0% 0.55% 
AAA CDOs 
(Collateralized 
Debt Obligation) 
2.7% 3.0% 95.0% 11.14% 
AA CDOs 0.2% 5.5% 95.0% 0.66% 
A CDOs 0.2% 11.5% 95.0% 0.69% 
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BBB (etc) CDOs 0.2% 15.0% 95.0% 0.53% 
CDO Equity 0.1% 50.0% 95.0% 0.16% 
AAA CLO 4.5% 4.0% 15.0% 3.94% 
Prime MBS 30.8% 3.0% 15.0% 29.96% 
ABS 8.6% 4.0% 55.0% 25.79% 
Totals 100.0%   100% 
Source: Retrieved from “Revisiting Rehypothecation: JP Morgan Markets Its Latest 
Doomsday Machine (or Why Repo May Blow Up the Financial System Again” by Y. Smith, 
2011, December 15 [Web log post] 
 
Some financial institutions were not prepared for what was happening, and 
the mentality of the expression “too big to fail” was about to be tested. In March 
2008 it was Bearn Sterns the first to succumb to the runs on the shadow 
banking system. Bear Sterns reached a point where the only assets that 
remained were the long-term assets and those would take time to be turned to 
cash at a fair price, Bear Stearns couldn’t stand by itself any longer. Securities 
that were once thought to be risk free were now toxic assets as they became 
harder to sell.  The Fed in a desperate measure to avoid panic brokered a deal 
for J.P. Morgan/Chase to purchase Bear Sterns, the deal was concluded but the 
Fed had to take Bear Sterns toxic assets that amounted to 30 billion dollars. 
This rapid action from the Fed permitted investors to soothe their expectations. 
Doing so, the Fed thought the crisis was contained and that they should be 
aware of inflation any time soon (Mishhkin, 2009; Temin, 2010). 
They were wrong. 
According to Temin (2010), in August of 2008, the Fed realized the crisis 
wasn’t over as they also had to take over the two quasi-governmental mortgage 
brokers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Even at this moment public figures were 
declaring that the problem was the housing sector.  
Again in September 2008 the Fed was called to act, now it was Lehman 
Brothers turn to be experiencing major difficulties, but this time the Fed wasn’t 
there to help. Lehman Brothers failure was a mark for the population which 
indicated that banks were taking more risks than they used to. The risk aversion 
started to increase exponentially, the Fed couldn’t help the panic. Lehman 
Brothers was US’s fourth largest investment Bank by asset size with over 600 
billion dollars in assets and 25 000 employees. This was the biggest bankruptcy 
that US experienced and the mentality of “too big to fail” fell to the ground. The 
Fed couldn’t find a buyer for Lehman Brothers, and so their explanation for 
Lehman’s collapse was that it had taken large risks and it had to pay the price 
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for its choices. The downward movement had started, the uncertainty led to a 
mass selling of securities, which led to a drop in asset prices and led banks to 
struggle for liquidity. What happened next was somewhat inevitable, AIG 
collapsed on the same month, and the only way the Fed found to revert the 
situation was to nationalize the insurance company. The crisis had infected all 
the financial market, and the nationalization of AIG only confused the market. In 
the same day of AIG nationalization, the Reserve Primary fund was overrun and 
the TARP was set in motion (Mishhkin, 2009; Eichengreen et al, 2010; Temin, 
2010). 
TARP was set in motion to avoid financial institutions to file for bankruptcy, 
taxpayers money was avoiding a collapse of the financial system. The banks 
that were saved were once again deemed “too big to fail”. The TARP also 
intended to protect home values and homeownership. These goals were a 
wreck, 700 billion dollars have been gathered to buy mortgages, those 
mortgages were to be modified to help homeowners avoiding foreclosures. 
Instead the money was infused into the nation’s largest financial institutions, 
with no policy, no requirements nor a bank report whatsoever that obliged those 
institutions to compel the extension of credit. Therefore it was no surprise that 
lending continued to decline (Barofsky, 2011).  
The Home Affordable Modification Program included in the TARP was a 
greater disappointment. The program consisted in modifying existing mortgages 
to help four million families. The rush to get the program started, has created 
innumerous flaws and foreclosures continued to pile up. Another measure of the 
TARP was to assure that large banks would be regulated to diminish their threat 
to US financial system, and like Sheila Bair advocated the objective was to 
simplify or shrink the most complex financial institutions, instead the biggest 
banks grew larger 20% than they were before the crisis (Barofsky, 2011). 
Barofsky (2011), being the special inspector general for the TARP from 2008 
until now, expresses his analysis of the TARP as follows: “In the final analysis, it 
has been Treasury’s broken promises that have turned TARP — which was 
instrumental in saving the financial system at a relatively modest cost to 
taxpayers — into a program commonly viewed as little more than a giveaway to 
Wall Street executives.” 
TARP’s main goals were not obtained due to mismanagement and disregard 
of its primary goals. The government lost is credibility and it will be extremely 
hard for future policymakers to regain that credibility again and to do what they 
must to avoid another crisis. Barofsky (2011) believes that “This avoidable 
political reality might just be TARP’s most lasting, and unfortunate, legacy.”  
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3.6 Banking System Versus Shadow Banking System  
Policy makers are the main responsible for the banking fragility, the 
encouraging of the housing boom, the excessive leverage, and the collapse of 
the subprime bubble. This was only possible through loose monetary policy, 
fiscal and the lack of regulatory policies (Grossman & Meissner, 2010). 
According to Schlenkhoff (2009, p.37) the first mistake that ultimately led to 
the Financial Crisis was the lack of regulation on the shadow banking system. 
Krugman believed the way to prevent this situation was to create a simple rule 
which was “anything that does what a bank does, anything that has to be 
rescued in crises the way banks are, should be regulated like a bank”,  but what 
could be done now to remedy what was already done? 
This time it didn’t matter if the institutions were “too big to fail”, if they were 
heavily branched, or highly concentrated banks, the crisis didn’t spare even 
those. The banking system was severely unregulated (Grossman & Meissner, 
2010). 
Instead of creating regulations and rules for the banking system, what 
actually happened was quite the opposite. In 1999, instead of limiting the 
operation of the shadow banking system, the banking legislation was changed. 
Even legislation that came since the Great Depression had changed. The Glass 
Steagal Act was abolished due to the Congress debate of 1987 where it was 
argued that commercial banks would seek low risk opportunities, they were 
dead wrong. The separation between the roles of commercial banks and 
investment banks was dimmed in a way that permitted commercial banks to 
participate in operations that were exclusive for investment banks that were 
riskier. Investment banks felt they had to differentiate from commercial banks 
and the best way for them to differentiate was to take even more leverage and 
risk on their investments (Kraner, 2010; Schlenkhoff, 2009). 
The creation of the shadow banking system permitted a great financial 
innovation. The system included investment banks, insurance companies, but 
the innovation was created especially around managed funds. These funds 
included hedge funds, money market funds, SIV’s, ABCP and more. The most 
common way for the shadow bank to operate was to remove some of their 
investments from the balance sheets by using ABCP or SIV’s conduits, this way 
banks would provide liquidity and credit enhancements to these conduits. Banks 
would have capital relief by switching from loans into investments in the form of 
AAA-rated tranches of CDO’s and CLO’s (Collateralized Loan Obligation). The 
AAA securities would stay on the banking system (Kraner, 2010; Schlenkhoff, 
2009). 
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The innovation could be salutary to the economy, but the lack of 
understanding, regulation, in summary, the lack of control of the financial sector 
has permitted the financial innovation to become a way to conceal the risk. 
Instruments like SIV’s were removed from the balance sheet, but the liabilities 
stayed within the bank.   Without the understanding of the systemic risk 
embedded in financial operations, the financial system had become seriously 
weakened in such a way that a simple blow would evolve and reveal its 
fragilities (Mishkin, 2010; Schlenkhoff, 2009).  
To increase even more its fragilities it has to be said that the shadow 
banking system only had access to safety nets like deposit insurance back in 
2008 (Kraner, 2010). 
 
3.7 The Federal Reserve and Government Role 
Although the government shouldn’t be blamed by the choices of 
homeowners and investors that ultimately led to the subprime crisis, they should 
be blamed for creating ways that guaranteed financing to families with high risk 
of default. The way for the government to guarantee the access to finance for 
those families was through Government-sponsored enterprises. The three 
GSE’s (Government-sponsored enterprises) were: The Federal National 
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac); and the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) which 
was composed by 12 regional banks (Jagannathan et al, 2009; Kraner, 2010). 
The role of Freddie Mae and Freddie Mac consisted in two lines of business: 
The first, was the securitization and guaranteeing of conforming prime 
mortgages which required a relatively low level of capital reserves 
(2,5% was mandated) given the high quality of collateral (the federal 
government providing the ultimate tail risk insurance). The second line 
of business was the retained portfolio of investments in MBS which was 
allowed under the charter as long as the tranches purchased satisfied 
the 80% LTV requirement (Jagannathan et al, 2009, p. 26). 
 
To continue lending these GSEs have bought a high amount of Alt-A 
subprime mortgages. In 2007 the GSEs investments in subprime markets 
totaled 10% of the entire non-prime market. This attitude had no appropriate 
regulation from the government and therefore has contributed for the systemic 
risk of the system which in turn contributed to the financial crisis (Kraner, 2010). 
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Table 6: Prime VS Nonprime Mortgages, 2001-2006 (in Billion $) 
Year Nonprime Prime Total Nonprime ARMs 
2001 310 1905 2215 14% 355 
2002 422 2463 2885 15% 679 
2003 615 3330 3945 16% 1034 
2004 1070 1850 2920 37% 1464 
2005 1370 1750 3120 44% 1490 
2006 1430 1550 2980 48% 1340 
Source: Adapted from “Causes of The Great Depression and the Great Financial Crisis” by 
S. Kraner, 2010, pp. 36. Diploma Thesis Unpublished, Fakulteta Za Management Koper of 
Univerza Na Primorskem, Koper  
 
GSE’s could lever up to 40 times, which allowed them to take gigantic 
proportions and on the brink of the crisis in 2007, their portfolios amounted to a 
trillion dollars. GSE’s were the largest subprime investors (Jagannathan et al, 
2009).  
Ben Bernanke has become chairman of the Fed Board on February 1, of 
2006, a year before the start of the financial crisis. Bernanke being a scholar of 
the Great Depression took immediate measures to prevent the crisis from 
reaching a point of no return (Hummel, 2011). 
One of the lessons learned from the Great Depression was that the Fed has 
the tools to reflate the economy and prevent inflation. Until 2008, the Fed was 
worried about inflation and so its policies consisted in sterilizing the effects on 
the monetary base of its diverse liquidity operations, this kind of behavior made 
monetary policy tighter and increased the effect of the recession which started 
in December 2007. In October 2008, the Fed’s monetary policy changed. 
(Bordo & James, 2009). 
Bernanke was focused on avoiding another Great Depression at any cost, 
he was taking experimental measures to find which ones would work for the 
current crisis (Mishkin, 2010). 
The first measure was using plain and simple monetary policy, in September 
2007 meeting, the Fed lowered its federal funds rate target from 5,25 percent  
to 4,75 percent. In April 2008 the rate was down to 2 percent, the downward 
movement led the rate to fall even further and by December 2008 the target 
range of federal funds rate reached 0 to 0,25 percent. In mid-August 2007 the 
Fed has also lowered the discount rate to 0,5 percent but this measure would 
only improve liquidity to banks since by tradition only banks would use discount 
lending. Recurring to discount lending would raise questions to the bank’s 
health since it was regarded as a sign of lack of liquidity (when banks don’t 
have anywhere else to turn). To avoid this kind of thought the Fed created the 
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TAF (Term Auction Facility), this would allow banks to borrow anonymously 
(Bordo & James, 2009). 
The TAF now offered additional funds to banks for periods up to 84 days, 
when at first was only for a few days. The TAF worked as an auction. The Fed 
sets the amount to be lent and the banks would bid for the interest rate. These 
actions would greatly improve liquidity, if there was nothing else to it. With these 
kind of policies Bernanke was giving with one hand and taking with the other by 
selling Treasury securities, in the end of August 2008, the monetary base 
increased only by 2.24 percent against 7.54 percent average annual growth 
during Greenspan’s mandate (Hummel, 2011). 
The TAF was working as intended since it helped to lower interest rates, 
improve the performance of the dollar swap markets and to lower interbank risk 
premiums (Mishkin, 2010). 
Even before the federal funds rate reached 0, the Fed tried nonconventional 
methods to loosen up the monetary tightening. They achieved that by 
purchasing long-term Treasuries and mortgage backed securities. This 
measure provided liquidity for banks and financial institutions alike. The Fed 
also expanded the types of securities that served as collaterals (Bordo & 
James, 2009; Mishkin, 2010). 
One of the problems the Fed faces will be when the incentives to increase 
the liquidity need to be tightened, if the unemployment is still high there will be 
political pressure to stop the tightening. In this case the Fed will have 2 options, 
if the Fed will fall under the pressure and stop the tightening the unemployment 
could fall but the belief in its policies will be shaken which would result in 
inflationary pressures. On the other hand if it continues its policies of tightening, 
unemployment will naturally rise (Bordo & James, 2009).  
According to Bordo this wasn’t the best way to solve the situation at hand. 
With the uncertainty shock generated by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
(uncertainty increased by 0.94 percent from September 2009 to October 2009, 
it was the largest increase since April 1934), the reaction of monetary and fiscal 
policies reduced by more than half. So the Fed: 
Emphasized on providing liquidity to the market when that is not the 
answer to the problem of the market’s uncertainty about solvency of 
individual or sectoral firms. No financial market can function normally 
when basic information about the solvency of the market participants is 
lacking (Schlenkhoff, 2009, p. 46). 
 
Bordo also disagrees with the method Bernanke used, he considers the 
method complicated when a different and uncomplicated model was available, 
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which was open market operations. Open market operations would leave “the 
distribution of liquidity to individual firms to the market”. While with the model 
that was adopted the Fed could select the credit recipients (Hummel, 2011, 
p.502). 
Romer (2009) doesn’t share the same opinion as Bordo, she believes that 
the experience of the 1930’s proved that monetary policy has an important role 
in recovery even when interest are close to zero. Monetary policy can prevent 
expectations of deflation as it was done during the Great Depression recovery. 
Monetary expansion has revived the economy by stabilizing American beliefs 
on price stability or even inflation in a period that was overrun by rapid deflation.  
Although in the Great Depression US had its monetary policy restrained by 
the obligation of defending the gold standard, in this financial crisis US lives by 
the Bretton Woods II system. The Bretton Woods II surged when Bretton 
Woods collapsed in 1971. Like the gold standard the Bretton Woods pegged 
their currency to gold, but this time in Bretton Woods II it is the dollar that has 
become the reserve currency for international transactions (Schlenkhoff, 2009). 
With the dollar functioning as a reserve currency it has become more and 
more attractive, so other countries could borrow US without any affrays. So 
when the “Cold War” ended US lost its position as the world lender, and China 
who ended being a loser in the cold war has become the primary lender of US 
propping its consumption (Temin, 2010).  
The Asian crisis in 1997, made the emerging Asian economies extremely 
averse to the risk. The way they used to reduce the risk was to amass large 
sums of reserve currencies and to conduct a tight fiscal policy to avoid heavy 
fluctuations. With the dollar functioning as a reserve currency it has become 
more and more attractive, so other countries could easily borrow US dollars. 
(Schlenkhoff, 2009). 
The lending US was receiving has influenced the current account deficits 
that ultimately brought the housing price bubbles and the unprecedented 
expenditure on financial instruments. (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
 
3.8 International Labor Shocks 
According to Ohanian (2011) the Great Financial crisis suffers from exactly 
the same as the Great Depression which is the labor market dysfunction, 
leaving to second plan the role of the financial panics. Ohanian (2011) 
recognizes that capital market imperfections led to broader economic problems, 
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but capital deviations were too small (0,1 to 0,3 in US and high income 
countries) to suggest this was the main problem.  
Ohanian’s opinion is shared by other economists who believe that the 
fundamental cause of the crisis was the huge labor supply shock which led 
people to thrive for liquidity and money supply. The main cause for this shock 
had its origin outside US when a number of countries adopted policies that 
permitted them to enter the global markets, this created a surplus of labor force. 
The surplus of labor force coming from those countries caused the distortions 
US is experiencing today (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
Ohanian studied the variation of the labor markets, capital and productivity 
during the current recession and compared it with post World War II recessions 
variations. In his study he has figured that (has shown in the table below) 
although there was only a small deviation among the capital and productivity 
factors in US there was a huge deviation among the labor factor. The most 
noticeable way of showing that the main problem was the labor factor is by 
observing the reactions of the financial markets with the news of AIG and 
Lehman Brothers. Although the financial markets adjusted to these news by 
increasing 2,5 percent in Baa Bonds in late 2008, they readjusted again by 
dropping 3 percent. The labor hours worked in US didn’t have the same faith 
and even in mid-2010 the recovery was somewhat short (Ohanian, 2011). 
 
Table 7: Recessions Deviations in the US and Other Nations 
 LABOR 
DEVIATION 
% 
CAPITAL 
DEVIATION 
% 
PRODUCTIVITY 
DEVIATION 
% 
AVERAGE, OTHER POSTWAR 
RECESSIONS (US) 
-2.4 1.8 -2.2 
2007 – 2009 RECESSION 
(US) 
12.9 0.3 -0.1 
AVERAGE, OTHER HIGH-
INCOME COUNTRIES 
0.9 0.1 -7.1 
Source: Adapted from “Accounting for the Great Recession” by L. Ohanian, 2011, The 
Region, 25 (2), pp. 47 
 
In the table there is evidence of a large discrepancy of labor deviation 
between the countries with US being largely penalized with more than 12.9% 
compared with the 0.9% of the average of the other high income countries. In a 
well-functioning labor market the marginal product of labor should be the same 
rate at which the households are willing to trade their labor hours by leisure 
hours. The -12.9% meant that the population would rather work than to apply 
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their time in leisure activities. This created a surplus of work in the US 
(Ohanian, 2011). 
According to Schlenkhoff (2009), the labor market dysfunction can be 
explained in part by the Bretton Woods II system. The periphery countries with 
an undervalued currency becomes export oriented and starts to accumulate a 
trade surplus, while the center country, in this case US, increases its trade 
deficit. China was one of the periphery countries that took advantage of its 
undervalued currency, the renminbi. The prices China was practicing has made 
some goods sectors unattractive in US, which led unemployment to increase in 
those sectors. 
The peripheral countries such as China and India converted their massive 
population into a productive force the world has never seen in our modern days. 
This is still working brilliantly for those two countries. The World needs to adapt 
to this unexpected change in the World economy. When China opened to 
foreign investors in 1979, the huge overflow of underemployed labor to the 
manufacturing and industrial sectors changed entirely the world economy. In 
1979, China had accounted for less than 2% of the world GDP and in 2007 that 
number has grown to a staggering 6%, becoming the third largest economy 
worldwide (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
China’s transformations were only possible due to the changes in the costs 
of international trade, in an era for when a small disturbance in prices could 
increase/decrease cross-border transactions; the reduction on the prices of 
transportation costs, commercial policy variables, insurance costs, financing 
costs and more have completed the loop for China. China could now export all 
over the World maintaining the price attractiveness (Grossman & Meissner, 
2010). 
According to Jagannathan et al (2009), although China started without any 
technological know-how, the attractiveness of its economy brought a great 
number of foreign firms to install their plants there, which significantly boosted 
China’s know-how. The final piece of the puzzle started in 1992, when the yuan 
was devalued by more than 30%. While the FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) 
was of about 1% of GDP before 1992, after 1992 it increased by more than 6%. 
All these measures had put China between the huge players of the World 
Economy, their net exports increased exponentially from 0% in the 1990’s to 
around 15% of GDP in 2007. 
In the U.S. we are stating the opposite the population is over-aging, mainly 
due to baby-boomers reaching their retirement age, creating a drop in labor 
input.  
As Ohanian states “… the decline in economic output and income is due 
exclusively to a drop in labor input.” (2011, p. 44). Also there was a decrease of 
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8.7 percent of per capita hours worked during this recession while in other 
postwar recessions the decline average was of only 3.2 percent. This led the 
labor input to be seriously compromised.  
Another factor that makes China more attractive than the US is the fact that 
China doesn’t have a Social Security System, reducing the costs of labor. Also, 
while US population has access to all sorts of credit, in China the population 
has to save for everything (cars, homes, retirement, etc). This system creates a 
surplus of money that in time is injected in the occidental countries that are avid 
for consumption (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
According to Schlenkhoff (2009), the pensions of the US retired population 
have to be financed by an increase in savings rate. It was in fact financed by an 
increase in savings, but in the place where it was the least expected. The 
increase in savings was made by the emerging Asian markets. It was expected 
that the drop in US GDP would push US households to increase their savings 
but US private consumption remained at 70% of GDP (Jagannathan et al, 
2009). 
 
Illustration 13: To Whom Does the U.S. Government Owe Money? 
 
Source: Retrieved from “To Whom Does the U.S. Government Realyy Owe Money?” by C. 
Eyermann, 2011, March 11 [Web log post] 
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China is by far US biggest foreign lender, but the graph shows that US’ 
public debt is mainly held by Americans through the Social Security Trust Fund, 
Pension Funds, US Fed and other US entities. 
Like Bernanke states in 1997 the markets started a “global saving glut” with 
the growing scariness of the financial markets, but what finally destabilized the 
global markets was the Asian Financial crisis in 1997. The Asian markets with a 
huge surplus of incoming money started to conduct a policy of savings together 
with a fiscal policy in order to prevent heavy fluctuations from the currency 
markets (Schlenkhoff, 2009). 
The Chinese intentionally devaluated their currency in order to maintain the 
competitiveness of their export sector, and thus constraining its domestic 
consumption. The consumption of China’s households was somewhat limited, 
with consumer loans constituting less than 12.5% of all bank loans in 2007 with 
80% of those 12.5% being for housing with an initial down payment of about 
30%. With those policies China’s savings increased to 130% of US savings in 
2007 while a decade before they represented only a third (Jagannathan et al, 
2009). 
 
Illustration 14: The ratios of China and US Gross National Savings and Nominal GDP 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Causes of The Great Recession of 2007-9: The Financial Crisis is 
The Symptom Not The Disease” by R. Jagannathan, M. Kapoor and E. Schaumburg, 2009, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, [Working Paper Nº 15404], pp. 9. Copyright 2009 by 
Ravi Jagannathan, Mudit Kapoor and Ernst Schaumburg. 
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According to Schlenkhoff (2009), China and other countries alike will 
continue to finance US economy, while it is still attractive. US economy 
continues to be a recipient of liquidity while the dollar continues to be the 
reserve currency of the world and while many commodities continue to be 
traded in dollars (Jagannathan et al, 2009). 
 
Illustration 15: Change in Chinese holdings of US assets by asset class in US $M 
 
Source: Jagan Retrieved from “Causes of The Great Recession of 2007-9: The Financial 
Crisis in The Symptom Not The Disease” by R. Jagannathan, M. Kapoor and E. Schaumburg, 
2009, National Bureau of Economic Research, [Working Paper Nº 15404], pp. 12. Copyright 
2009 by Ravi Jagannathan, Mudit Kapoor and Ernst Schaumburg.nathan et al, 2009, p.12 
 
Bear in mind that US economy is only attractive to a certain point and in time 
these countries will stop financing the high levels of US’ consumption, but for 
now as the graphic above shows the financing continues to grow. (Schlenkhoff, 
2009),  
While the demand for reserves remains low relative to the size of the US 
economy this model will stand. The model will only loose its fiscal sustainability 
when the demand for reserves will grow to a point where it becomes too large 
and this will turn to a debt burden that would never stop increasing 
(Jagannathan et al, 2009). According to Schlenkhoff (2009), along with the 
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increase in savings in other countries, this will cause a reduction in trade which 
will cause a costly bill of shifting resources from export oriented sectors to 
sectors that produce goods for the domestic market and vice versa. 
 
Illustration 16: Foreign holdings of Dollar as a fraction of US GDP 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Causes of The Great Recession of 2007-9: The Financial Crisis in 
The Symptom Not The Disease” by R. Jagannathan, M. Kapoor and E. Schaumburg, 2009, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, [Working Paper Nº 15404], pp. 10. Copyright 2009 by 
Ravi Jagannathan, Mudit Kapoor and Ernst Schaumburg. 
 
According to Jagannathan et al (2009), one of the ways to revert the 
situation is if the dollar declines substantially, or if the wages of Chinese 
workers that are related with export related activities will rise sharply. The other 
approach to stop the rising of capital flows to the US, is the rise in alternative 
currencies, with the Euro being the strongest candidate. The graphic above 
shows that since its creation the Euro has become more and more a currency of 
reference, and it will surely continue to increase in importance among the 
international markets. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
Since the World War I the US was the World’s main creditor and it has 
continued like that until the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War the US was 
greatly increasing its internal consumption. To keep the continuous increase in 
consumption the US had to be financed by other countries. The attractiveness 
of the American economy has guaranteed that the borrowing would continue. 
This way the US passed from the main creditor to a debtor position. The main 
creditor role has passed to China. That kind of consumption has led the US 
economy to develop at a staggering velocity.   
 The beginning of the 21st Century started with a mild recession caused 
by the exuberance of high tech purchases due to the beginning of the new 
millennium. When the year known as y2k passed, there was a massive sell off 
of high tech shares that were overpriced from the previous year. To stop the 
losses on the stock market, the Fed realized that the best way to do it was to 
lower interest rates. 
The Fed didn’t realize that by lowering interest rates, they would not only 
save the stock market from collapsing but they would also affect the population 
consumption in other areas. 
The consumption of US families has increased at a very high rate even 
when the wages remained practically the same. From 2000 to the beginning of 
the Great Financial crisis in 2007 the ratio of debt to wages doubled.  
The main responsible for this unmeasured increase in consumption were, 
without a doubt, the families that increased their debt more than they could 
bear, but the lack of regulation in the Financial System have created the tools 
for families to contract those amount of debts. 
The lack of regulation has permitted financial institutions to create a 
significant amount of tools to guarantee liquidity.  
The real estate market was regarded as a sure investment since there was 
no nationwide collapse of households since the Great Depression. Rating 
agencies had the same belief and so financial institutions could create the 
subprime market. 
Before the mortgage market was rather simple, the homebuyer would just 
apply to a mortgage a rate was given by looking to its financial data, the more 
risky the homebuyer was the higher the interest. If the mortgage had low risk it 
would be classified as Prime and if the risk was high it was considered as non-
prime. After the mortgage was secured the mortgage dealer had two options, 
keep it in his portfolio, or sell it to another investment. This way there was a 
share of the market that wasn’t being fulfilled and for a good reason I might add, 
80 
 
that share was the non-prime market. Mortgage dealers thought they had 
created a way to dilute the risk of having non-prime investments in their 
portfolio. Now after securing the mortgage, the mortgage dealer had two more 
options: the mortgage could be kept as collateral for the issuance of a security 
or it could be sold as collateral for the same purpose. This type of operation was 
known as the ABS. To reach even more share of the market the securities 
started to become more and more riskier, since there was the perception that if 
one of the mortgages of that security went bust the others would compensate 
for that loss. The market was flooded by subprime mortgages. Mortgage 
dealers never thought the housing market could fail all together.    
Ben Bernanke took charge of the Fed in February 2006, at this time his first 
objective was to control inflation at all cost, his policies were ineffective because 
financial institutions and government sponsored enterprises had all along the 
support of ratings agencies that masked what was really happening until it was 
too late. The real estate bubble had already been created. 
In 2007, there was a considerable number of defaults in mortgages, but the 
Fed wanted to do some damage control. In a desperate manner the Fed wanted 
to prevent inflation, by increasing interest rates but defaults skyrocketed even 
more with Fed’s decision. 
The mortgages with adjustable rates were seriously affected by this 
measure.  
The real estate bubble burst.  
The decline on housing prices led the BNP Paribas to suspend redemption 
of shares in some of its money market funds, in 7 August of 2007. 
The panic settled, and banks and families started to create a risk aversion 
especially towards the securitized markets known as the shadow banking 
system. The risk aversion has led the population to start runs on the shadow 
banking system, and the lack of information on the banks’ portfolio has made 
everyone to consider them equal in terms of risk. 
Bear Sterns was the first to experience difficulties but the Fed negotiated its 
purchase with JP Morgan, although it had to buy Bear Sterns toxic assets. The 
Fed thought they had contained the crisis when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
the two quasi-governmental mortgage brokers, showed their financial 
weaknesses in August 2008. The Fed took over these two institutions and the 
crisis was again contained.  
In September 2008, the Fed blew all is efforts as it didn’t find a solution for 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The Lehman Brothers failure was Fed’s 
message that banks were taking more risks than they should have. The lack of 
Fed’s action in this situation has opened a Pandora’s Box. Risk aversion 
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increased abruptly. The downward spiral was set in motion since it created a 
“fire sale” of securities that made financial institutions to struggle for liquidity. 
A month later, Fed’s behavior was at least questionable when AIG Insurance 
Company was in financial distress by the same policy that was taken in the 
case of Lehman Brothers, it should suffer by its own mistakes. This time the 
Fed nationalized AIG which confused the markets. 
In October 2008, Bernanke being a scholar of the Great Depression decided 
to prevent another Depression through sound monetary policy. He wanted to 
give liquidity back to the economy in a desperate maneuver to prevent the 
crisis. Lines of credit were open to banks to prevent other bankruptcies. 
One thing that the US has on its side is that it isn’t linked to any fixed 
exchange rate and its currency works like the reserve currency of the world, as 
long as this stays the American economy will always be attractive.  
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CHAPTER IV
85 
4 Great Depression versus Great Financial Crisis 
The Great Depression is still the most severe, longest and broadest 
depression the World has ever seen, although there are events that can bring 
out the similarities between the Great Depression and the Great Financial 
Crisis. 
The banking crises of the Great Depression and the Great Recession had 
similar beginnings. Both were originated by a boom-bust macroeconomic cycle. 
The Roaring twenties were followed by The Great Depression and the 
encouragement of the housing boom, excessive leverage and subprime bubble 
in the early 2000’s created the Great Recession. The lax on regulatory 
structures of the 1920’s and 2000’s contributed to the magnitude of the 
Depression and the recent crisis (Grossman & Meissner, 2010). 
There are at least four mistakes that originally created the Great Depression: 
Squeezing Liquidity, Wage inflexibility, Closing down trade and Radical 
ideologies, Government spending. In the Great Recession 3 out of 4 of these 
mistakes have been solved (McMahon, 2009). 
 
4.1 Squeezing Liquidity 
According to McMahon (2009), this mistake was the first to be interventioned 
during the recent Financial crisis, Bernanke has taken some serious efforts to 
inject liquidity into the economy. Some could say that the actions that were 
adopted were not perfect, but at least the Banking Panics of the Great 
Depression have been avoided.  
The Banking Panics of the Great Depression still are the worst as well as the 
largest in economic history. Bear in mind that comparing the Great Depression 
policies to the ones adopted now it is not an easy task. In the recent recession, 
countries and central banks are more coordinated, there is no gold standard to 
restrict monetary policy. The figure of the lender of last resort did not exist in 
1929 like it exists today (Aiginger, 2010). During the Great Depression there 
were no institutions to maintain financial stability and even where there was 
regulation and supervision, they were not effective. The deposit insurance did 
not exist (Grossman & Meissner, 2010). 
According to Hummel (2011), Friedman and Schwartz the main problem of 
the US Banking system during the Great Depression started with the inept of 
Fed policy, with legal restrictions on the issue of money substitutes by private 
clearing houses. These policies have led the money stock to collapse. Between 
1929 and 1933 the money stock collapsed to a staggering one third in M2 and 
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one-fourth in M1. Alongside with the fall in money stock there was also a 
downfall of the money’s velocity. In summary, Friedman believes that the 
banking panics were generated by an enormous shock to aggregate demand 
(Hummel, 2011). 
Bernanke shares a different opinion. In his article “Nonmonetary Effects of 
the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression” he concludes 
that what caused the banking panics was a shock on aggregate supply, caused 
by the collapse of more than nine thousand banks. Banks were the main 
financial intermediaries and with their failure the credit flow collapsed with it 
(Hummel, 2011).  
In 1927, the Fed  decided to increase the discount rate from 3.8% to 5.3% in 
1929 in order to reduce stock market speculation. The spread of the Great 
Depression has obliged the Fed to reduce the discount rate to values below the 
ones in 1927. In 1931 the discount rate was of 2.5%. Although it was too late, 
between 1929 and 1932 money supply has reduced by 21%, and the bank runs 
seriously affected the velocity of money. Money supply would only start growing 
again in 1933/1934 (Aiginger, 2010). 
During the Great Depression the best way the Fed has encountered to fight 
financial panics was to create severely restrictive structural reforms which 
created a sort of financial lockdown. After 25 years of those reforms the system 
was crisis-free. It was only in the late 1960’s and in the beginning of the 1970’s 
that the regulatory system started to ease, and eventually the financial crisis 
reappeared. The current crisis was created by that ease on the lockdown 
(Grossman & Meissner, 2010). 
According to Grossman and Meissner (2010), the lack of regulation of the 
risk management procedures and the regulatory system has created some 
banks that were considered too big to fail, and if a single large bank fails the 
panic can cause a monetary contraction. This is exactly what happened in 
December 1930 during the Great Depression when the Bank of US failed. 
Public’s desire for currency-to-deposit ratio increased since depositors thrived 
to convert their deposits into cash (Grossman & Meissner, 2010). 
The banking panic caused a decrease in M1 and M2 because the demand 
for currency and reserves increased. Friedman and Schwartz believe that if this 
bank could be saved the panic could somewhat be eased (Hummel, 2011). This 
time the Fed has taken serious measures to avoid a banking panic in some 
cases Governments have temporarily nationalized banks and manufacturing 
firms to prevent their collapse. These actions were only possible because 
monetary policy wasn’t limited by the gold standard, and there was strong 
cooperation between countries, andno signs of hyperinflation in decades 
(Aiginger, 2010). 
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According to Hummel (2010), Friedman believes that in order to avoid 
financial panics there are two factors to consider: if the panic is originated by 
the money stock or if it is caused by the lack of financial intermediation. If the 
problem is caused by the collapse of money supply it can be solved by an 
injection of liquidity into the financial system avoiding a collapse on aggregate 
demand and price level. If the problem is caused by lack of credit then bailouts 
should be the answer. When conducting bailouts of financial institutions, there 
are some things to bear in mind for example, if the institutions are deemed 
insolvent by taking excessive risk, corrupt management or others reasons. If the 
institutions are deemed insolvent they should be permitted to go under that is as 
long as money and prices remain stable (Hummel, 2011). 
The financial panics of the Great Recession have brought back the reforms 
that followed the Great Depression. Secretary Timothy Geithner as revealed is 
thoughts saying that “the reforms that followed the Great Depression laid the 
foundation for decades of prosperity and led to one of the most-impressive 
records of investment”(Weidner, 2010, p.1). 
The financial panics of the Great Recession started in August 2007 in the 
investment banking. Investment banks had changed abruptly in this century, 
while in the past they served as facilitators of financial securities’ transfers, they 
can now own the securities themselves (Hummel, 2011). The financial reform of 
the 1990’s has complicated the financial industry. The separation between 
commercial banks and investment banks simply disappeared. Investment banks 
could now merge with commercial banks (Weidner, 2010). The new rules have 
skyrocketed investment banks funds accounts from 500 billion dollars in 1994 to 
a staggering 3 trillion dollars while commercial banks had an increase of less 
than half from 4 trillion dollars back in 1994 to 11 trillion in 2007 (Hummel, 
2011). 
According to Hummel (2011), through repos investments banks were now 
extending its business to commercial banks and were buying short to lend long 
creating the “shadow banking system”. What was even more troublesome was 
that the collaterals of the repos were usually treasury securities (safe collateral) 
but as the time passed by, the collaterals could be any marketable instruments, 
including complex securitized debt. 
Commercial banks overnight repos were counted in M2 and later in M3, 
investment bank repos were never counted in monetary measures. When the 
Fed discontinued reporting M3 in March 2006, there was no way of knowing 
how big this market was. When mortgage market securities started to fall in late 
2007 and in 2008, it led to a series of runs on financial institutions. These runs 
were different from the ones during The Great Depression. This time the runs 
were directed to the “shadow banking system”. Repos fell abruptly and with 
them so did the money supply (Hummel, 2011; Mishkin, 2010). 
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Illustration 17: Selected Short-Term Collateralized Debt Instruments, 2001-2010 
(Billion $) 
 
Source: Retrieved  from “Ben Bernanke versus Milton Friedman: The Federal Reserve’s 
Emergence as the U.S. Economy’s Central Planner” by J. Hummel, 2011, The Independent 
Review, 15 (4), pp. 499. 
 
Fed’s response to this subprime financial crisis was swift and prevented a 
full-fledged financial panic. The Fed injected liquidity into the financial system 
and against what Bernanke usually suggested it has followed Friedman’s 
suggestion, which was to inject liquidity and not only to insolvent institutions. 
Responding to the panic Bernanke as lowered discount rates and created the 
Term auction facility in December 2007, which allowed banks to determine the 
interest rate through auction. Although the main injection of liquidity came only 
in March 2008 when it was created, the Primary Lender extended the discount 
loans and the Term Lending Facility lengthened the time for dealers to swap 
their riskier assets into other securities. This last move has greatly increased 
the repo markets. Bordo seriously objected Bernanke’s moves by explaining 
that the distribution of liquidity should not be focused by this but instead the 
liquidity should be provided by the market. To obtain that the Fed should use 
open market operations (Hummel, 2011). 
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Illustration 18: Monetary Growth (M1, M2, and MZM), 2000-2009 
 
Notes: M1 is from the Board of Governors, monthly and not seasonally adjusted: MINS. M2 
is from the Board of Governors, monthly and not seasonally adjusted:M2NS, MZM is from the 
St. Louis Fed. monthly and not seasonally adjusted: MZMNS. Annual year-on-year growth rates 
are author’s calculations. 
Source: Retrieved from “Ben Bernanke versus Milton Friedman: The Federal Reserve’s 
Emergence as the U.S. Economy’s Central Planner” by J. Hummel, 2011, The Independent 
Review, 15 (4), pp. 501. 
 
4.2 Wage Inflexibility 
The second mistake that led to the Great Depression was the wage 
inflexibility. When the Great Depression was still in the beginning, the main 
actors of the economy (government, businesses, unions, and others) believed 
that the best way to avoid an economic collapse was to maintain the 
consumption high. To keep the consumption high the wages have been kept 
high. The main actors didn’t realize that the deflationary economy have dropped 
the prices to a point were businesses couldn’t keep their employers with the 
same wages they had before. To ensure the survival of the companies many 
had to resort to mass layoffs (McMahon, 2009). 
Unemployment has increased to almost 25% in 1933, while in the recent 
recession the unemployment rate reached its peak in 2009 when it totaled 
9.3%. There is huge evidence here that although the increase in unemployment 
in the recent recession was high it can’t be compared with the numbers reached 
in the Great Depression. The expectation for 2010 is that the percentage of 
unemployment will remain similar to 2009 (Aiginger, 2010).  
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Illustration 19: Average Annual Unemployment Rate 
 
Source: Adapted from “Average Annual Unemployment Rate”, by Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(n.d.) 
 
In this recession, there were some concessions between the main actors. 
For now, with the lowering of wages, the exponential increase of unemployment 
has been somewhat stopped. The question that still remains is that if with the 
brink of recovery the demands for those who had their wages adjusted to catch-
up with their losses won’t create an inflationary storm? (McMahon, 2009). 
 
4.3 Closing down trade and radical ideologies 
According to McMahon (2009), another big mistake that led to the Great 
Depression was the closing down of international trade. The adoption of policies 
such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 has created a full out war against 
imported goods worldwide, which have crippled many economies.  
Although the effects of raising tariffs and import duties constituted a major 
source of revenue for government and a protection to domestic producers, the 
drop in World trade has reversed the situation (Aiginger, 2010). The Smoot-
Hawley Act has raised the tariffs of imported goods to an average of 60% over 
20 000 products and in reaction to this policy other countries have raised their 
barrier on US products. World trade dropped 66% between 1929 and 1934 
(Ahearn, 2009).  
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Illustration 20: Exports as Share of G.D.P 
 
Source: Retrieved from “Catalpa Research: First DIBs”, by Catalpa Capital (2012). 
 
The protectionism required to shield local companies may end up by 
aggravating an economic recession into a full economic depression (Aiginger, 
2010). 
In 1931, with sterling’s departure from the gold and the reduction of exports 
due to the retaliation of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act devaluations on domestic 
products prices started. The lack of capital was leading commodity exporters to 
sell their outputs at low prices to avoid debt default, each time decreasing their 
products prices (Grossman & Meissner, 2010).  
According to Grossman e Meissner (2010), although devaluation could bring 
benefits, foreign debt was limiting those benefits. 
In 1929, the reduction of GDP has totaled -27% whereas the recent crisis 
had a reduction of -2.4% (estimate) from the peak in 2008 to the forecast of 
2009. Comparing to the World GDP the US has suffered a worse fall in GDP 
especially during the Great Depression. World GDP lost only 9.8% during the 
Great Depression and during the recent financial crisis the fall was of 1.3% (real 
values). The development in China has lessened the fall of World GDP 
(Aiginger, 2010). 
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Table 8: Comparison of Two Crisis: Decline of Real GDP 
 
Great Depression Recent Crisis 
1929/1921 1929/1912 1932/1929 2008/2000 2008/1990 
2009 forecast/ 
peak 2008 
Trough 2009/         
peak 2008 
  Annual Data Annual Data 
Quarterly 
Data 
US 45,4 69,4 -27,0 18,4 63,8 -2,4 -3,8 1) 
World 44,7 38,8 -9,8 39,5 88,7 -1,1 -4,6 2) 
Notes:1)2Q2009/2Q2008, 2) Weighted by GDP (Austria, Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, 
Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Japan. 
Source: Adapted from “The Great Recession vs. the Great Depression: Stylized Facts on 
Siblings That Were Given Different Foster Parents” by K. Aiginger, 2010, Economics, The 
Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 4 (2010-18), pp. 8 
 
According to IMF forecasts, the loss in World GDP in 2009 will be 
compensated by the expected growth in 2010. The estimated recovery for the 
Great Recession will take two years in terms of GDP while in 1929 it took six 
years (Aiginger, 2010). 
The fall in exports was around 20 percent for both crisis, but the motives 
were different. During the Great Depression the fall in exports was mainly due 
to income declines, tariffs and other trade barriers, but in the recent crisis the 
motives are related to changes to the structure of trade and uncertainty. Since 
the Great Depression world trade has changed and as the share of trade of 
larger economies consists of consumer durables and investment goods, 
uncertainty will leave consumers and producers of those goods on hold 
(Grossman & Meissner, 2010). 
In the recent recession there were no policies that prevented the 
international trade to flow. Although there are still some voices that pretend the 
adoption of those kinds of policies (McMahon, 2009). The protectionism can be 
much more harmful now than it was back in the 1930’s for two reasons. First, 
global economy is much more open than it was. In 1930 the average tariff was 
of 50%, but it was declining to 25%. Nowadays it is reduced to an average of 
less than 10%. Secondly, today manufactured products are created by parts 
assembled all over the world (Cerdikwan, 2010). 
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Table 9: Comparison of Two Crisis: Decline of Real GDP 
 GREAT DEPRESSION RECENT CRISIS 
1929 1932 DEVIATION 2008 2009 DEVIATION 
US 9.4 5.1 -4.3 24.3 18.4 -5.9 
WORLD 23.2 14.7 -8.5 35.2 27.4 -7.8 
Source: Adapted from “The Great Recession vs. the Great Depression: Stylized Facts on 
Siblings That Were Given Different Foster Parents” by K. Aiginger, 2010, Economics, The 
Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 4 (2010-18), pp. 8 
 
Considering relative changes, the US “openness” has fallen abruptly during 
the Great Depression, while in the recent crisis the changes were less 
significant. Comparing the US with the World “openness” the changes were 
similar. Protectionism measures are being counteracted by regular international 
coordination meetings such as G20 (Group of Twenty Leaders, Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors), European Commission, IMF 
(International Monetary Fund), OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) and WTO (World Trade Organization). Even “Buy National 
Clauses” have been vigorously fought being most of them softened or 
abandoned (Aiginger, 2010). In 2010, President Obama has promised to double 
American exportations creating 2 million jobs. Obama’s Administration knows 
that the key for recovery is to grow exports and to do so they pressured China 
to value its currency and open its markets to the American businesses. Obama 
is also trying to work together with exporting companies to help them sell their 
goods and services all over the world. The result was that 2 years after, exports 
increased to 180 billion dollars a month from the original 140 billion dollars, 
which represents a 16% increase if the pace continues Obama will reach its 
goal. Although some economists believe that the increase is mainly due to 
economic trends like the end of the recession and increasing prices of 
commodities (Lowrey, 2012). 
The idea of a product made in one country and sold in another country is 
somewhat extinct. The supply chain changed and now it’s common for 
companies to use production sharing or vertical specialization. Each time a 
good crosses a border its cost will increase due to international trade costs 
which include transportation costs, commercial policies variables, insurance 
costs, finance costs and others. So if these costs increase there will be a 
decrease in cross-border transactions (Grossman & Meissner, 2010).    
Cooperations between foreign countries can turn national companies more able 
to deal with global competition. In summary, if trade barriers are set, everybody 
will worse off (Cerdikwan, 2010). 
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4.4 Government Spending 
According to McMahon (2009), the fourth error of the Great Depression is 
being repeated once again, which is the government spending. Although there 
was and still is a belief that a stimulus spending would help to avoid a downturn, 
most stimulus spending are ineffective. The massive government spending that 
must be obtained to pump the economy will generate huge debts and deficits. In 
2009, the US Government was predicting a deficit of 1.58 trillion dollars, which 
represents 11.2% of GDP. In 2010, it is predicted that public debt will rise close 
to 10 trillion dollars which represents about 70% of the US economy.  
The government spending during the current crisis was set in motion much 
faster than during The Great Depression. The government spending of the 
Great Depression only took place when Roosevelt took charge. To face 
extreme poverty and such, the US government had to increase its role in social 
welfare. Hoover had only a shy increase in spending through the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the latter part of 1932 which provided 
loans to state and local governments. Finally it was Roosevelt’s New Deal Plan 
that revolutionized social welfare and increased significantly government 
spending. In 1935 Roosevelt established the Social Security Act that provided 
public assistance to people that were in dire need of assistance. Per capita 
relief expenditures reached 160 per cent from 1932 to 1933, and almost tripled 
from 1932 to 1940 (Fishback, Haines & Kantor, 2005). 
The government spending of the 1920’s and the spending of Obama’s 
government are not comparable, at least not in figures. Since 1914, the 
government role has increased exponentially when compared to the GDP. As it 
is shown in the table below, the role of the government has greatly increased. 
 
Table 10: Government spending as a percentage of GDP 
 1890 1913 1929 1938 1973 
Germany 13 18 31 42 42 
France  9 12 23 39 
Netherlands  8 11 22 46 
United Kingdom 9 13 24 29 42 
United States  8 10 20 31 
Japan  14 19 30 23 
Average  12 18 28 37 
Source: Retrieved from “História Económica do Século XX – Relatório de Disciplina” by J. 
Leite, May 2005, Lecture Notes: University of Aveiro 
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The role of the government has increased not by choice, but because the 
society in a way forced governments to take measures to avoid a social 
collapse. Germany was the first government to create an obligatory insurance 
plan that covered work accidents, disease, disablement and illness this was 
back in the 1880’s and in the table the weight of Germany government is 
revealing of that option. 
The World Wars have made the governments to increase in size, since the 
joint effort required the mobilization of all resources the government was the 
only entity that could perform that job. The Wars have increased the level of 
tolerance to taxes and to the intervention of the government (Leite, 2005). 
 In the twenties, the US had surplus budget and it continued until 1929. In 
1930 expenditure has increased, to aggravate the situation, tax revenues fell 
sharply. To counteract the decrease on tax revenues, major tax increases have 
been implemented. The deficit has reached 4.7% in 1932 and it continued to 
grow to 5.5% in 1934 and 7% in 1936 (Aiginger, 2010). 
To mitigate the downturn the US Government adopted stimulus that were 
introduced in an early stage of the depression. It took only 6 months for the US 
Government to employ those stimulus,, this was a major difference compared 
with the late use of fiscal policy during the Great Depression. The kind of debt 
the US needs to employ the stimulus has to be financed from abroad. The US 
has to depend on the willingness of other economies to buy their debt. This kind 
of borrowing can lead to the collapse of the US Dollar, and because China is 
the biggest borrower it can create economic and political tensions between 
those two economies. As the US Government is predicting a double digit deficit 
it is a risk they have to take. The same tactic was used during the Great 
Depression to a certain point, Henry Morgenthau summarized this policy like 
this “Now, gentleman, we have tried spending money. We are spending more 
than we have ever spent before and it does not work… I say after eight years of 
this administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started… 
and an enormous debt, to boot.” At the time, despite the fact that the Americans 
lost their confidence on the economic system, they believed in Roosevelt’s 
Policies. Today, Obama’s Government is failing in two fronts, the population 
doesn’t believe in his policies, and the marketplace still resents it (Aiginger, 
2010; McMahon, 2009; Gramm, 2010).   
In the Great Depression, fiscal stimulus was adopted to mitigate or 
compensate the automatic stabilizers. In today’s recession, the multipliers are 
amplified by stimulus packages. One part of the US stimulus goes to subsidies 
for home and auto-buyers in the US. These subsidies can have a double effect, 
as they can create an unexpected increase of sales caused by the persuasion 
of lower prices and when the subsidies are over sales will drop abruptly 
(Aiginger, 2010; McMahon, 2009). 
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According to McMahon (2009), a big part of the government spending will be 
through the printing of money leading to inflation. More, another big part of the 
spending will be financed by future taxes, so there will be a tendency of 
consuming before the increase in taxes. 
 
 
Table 11: Comparison of two crises: budget deficit/surplus in % of GDP 
 
Source: Adapted from “The Great Recession vs. the Great Depression: Stylized Facts on 
Siblings That Were Given Different Foster Parents” by K. Aiginger, 2010, Economics, The 
Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 4 (2010-18), pp. 22 
 
4.5 Euro Versus Gold Standard 
Since its creation the Euro has grown in respectability and it has become a 
backup reserve currency for the dollar. If the Euro can function as a support 
currency for the dollar, the capital flows to the US will diminish and the demand 
for reserves will stay low avoiding a meltdown of the American currency. 
Although the importance of the Euro is undoubtable there are some voices 
among the economists that regard it as the new gold standard. 
 
4.5.1 The Creation of the Euro 
There was a general controversy when the idea of the Euro was raised. 
The thought of a monetary union across the European countries was an old 
idea that went as far as the gold standard, but the idea died as soon as the gold 
standard failed. The main European countries were living decades of prosperity 
and a stable currency. Their values were savings and thrift, and so an 
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inflationary economy and a weak currency were incompatible. Some people 
adverted for the risks of a fixed exchange rate, one of them was Helmut 
Schmidt who categorically affirmed that Western Europeans already had a fixed 
exchange rate called the gold standard, and that there was a parallel to be 
drawn from the Euro to the Gold Standard (Cohen-Setton, 2012). 
Despite their warnings the Euro was created anyway, and when in the gold 
standard there was a failsafe that permitted countries to abandon the gold 
standard during harsh times, the Euro had no such thing. The reason why the 
Euro didn’t have a failsafe was to demonstrate that is was solid, progressive 
and irreversible (Eichengreen & Temin, 2010).  
 
4.5.2 Similarities between the Euro and the Gold Standard 
Fixed exchange rates facilitate communication and business in good times 
but when things get bad the problems are intensified. When the gold standard 
was created there was an understanding that a failsafe had to be created to 
avoid major crisis. Gold standard creators developed a rule that when things got 
really sour the exchange rate could become unfixed. In the Euro’s case that 
doesn’t apply since national currencies have been abandoned (Cohen-Setton, 
2012). 
Eichengreen (1995) shows in his book that a fixed exchange rate will only 
work as long as there is cooperation. This is well shown in the interwar era, to 
be more exact, until 1918. After 1918, countries started to act for their own 
interest, and so the collapse of the gold standard has become inevitable.  
The end of the gold standard started in October 1929, when US increased 
the interest rates when trying to defend their gold parity. The increase in interest 
rates has dried up the gold reserves of the gold bloc, and so in 1933 to 
aggravate the deflationary pressure on the countries of the gold bloc France 
also increased their interest rates draining even more the world gold reserves. 
In the end, if there was a coordinated effort to establish interest rates across the 
countries committed to the gold standard things would have been different 
(Eichengreen & Temin, 2010). 
According to Eichengreen and Temin (2010), another similarity between the 
Euro and the gold standard alongside with the lack of coordinating national 
macroeconomic policies was the lack of an emergency facility to provide 
assistance to countries in financial distress.  
When the Euro was adopted there was awareness that the only way it could 
survive was if financial and fiscal policies were created for the common concern 
of Europe as a whole, and there had to be coordinated adjustments that 
guarantee that there would always be countries with chronic surplus that 
needed to expand and countries with chronic deficit that did the opposite. To 
98 
balance this equilibrium various mechanisms of coordination were created such 
as the Stability Growth Pact, the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (Cohen-Setton, 2012). 
According to Cohen-Setton (2012), the coordination procedures failed as 
Europe is riven by imbalances. The fiscal and monetary constraints applied to 
some of the countries that have chronic deficits left them no hope of escaping 
their financial burdens. It sounds a bit like the 1930’s when there was the 
mentality that the economy should be purged from its rottenness. 
Euro-zone members lost their monetary independence, but now they are 
losing their fiscal freedom of action to Germany’s will. This is a really dangerous 
situation since fiscal policy was the only independent policy tool left to Eurozone 
members (Chancellor, 2010). 
The only countries that maintained the gold standard for a longer period 
were the ones that used protectionism tariffs, but in the end even they 
eventually left the gold standard. As Europe abolished protectionist tariffs even 
that possibility has been denied for the Euro-zone Governments (Eichengreen, 
1995; Buttonwood, 2010). 
The gold standard as a fixed exchange rate was a key part of the problem 
during the Great Depression, and now we have the Euro as a fixed exchange 
rate. Actually there are two forms of fixed exchange rates active today, the Euro 
as a formal fixed exchange rate, and the dollar that represents an informal fixed 
exchange rate through much of the emerging world since the dollar is used by 
many of those countries to export/import (Bootle, 2012). 
  
4.5.3 Debt - Then Versus Now 
According to the table below, although the countries with the most debt are 
(by descending order): Ireland, Spain, Britain, Japan and the US, the countries 
that are at the heart of the current fiscal crisis are the Europe Southern region 
such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal (Buttonwood, 2010). 
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Table 12: Debt and Primary Balances (In percent of GDP) 
 
Notes: 1/ Excludes losses from financial system support measures in Japan and the United 
States. Structural balances are reported in percent of nominal GDP - 2/ Primary balance is 
assumed to improve gradually during 2011-20; thereafter, It is maintained constant until 2030. 
The lasr column shows the primary balance improvement needed to stabilize debt at end-2011 
level if the respective debt-to-GPD ratio is less than 60 percent (no shading, “lower debt”); or to 
bring debt ratio to 60 percent in 2030 (shaded entries, “higher debt”). Illustrative scenarios for 
Japan are based on its net debt, and assume a target of 80 percent of GPD. For Norway, 
maintenance of primary surpluses at their projected 2012 level is assumed. The analysis makes 
simplifying assumptions: in particular, beyond 2011, an interest rate-growth rate differential of 1 
percent is assumed, regardless of country-specific circumstances. 
Source: Retrieved from “The State of Public Finances Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor: 
November 2009”, by International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department (2009, November 
3) 
 
There is a big difference between US, Japan, Britain and the rest of the 
European countries. That difference is called the fixed exchange rate, in other 
words the Euro. The former three can issue debt in their own currency, and so 
they can devalue their currency, the Euro countries are not so lucky. The only 
way Euro countries can devalue their currency is by leaving the Euro zone. 
Doesn’t it sound familiar? Doesn’t it feel like a recreation of the gold standard? 
(Buttonwood, 2010). 
The Euro has increased the production costs of some countries like Italy and 
Ireland when compared to Germany. The Euro countries can’t devalue their 
currency and so the only way to gain competitiveness is to deflate (Chancellor, 
2010). 
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4.5.4 Abandoning a fixed exchange rate 
The gold standard and the Euro suffer from the same flaw, that is the lack of 
an exit contingency plan. In the Lisbon Treaty there is no provision to an 
incumbent member of the Euro area that opts to readopt its national currency 
(Cohen-Setton, 2012; Eichengreen & Temin, 2010). 
Although the exit procedures today are not similar at all, the demands are 
totally different. Leaving the Euro-zone is much harder than it was for a country 
to leave the gold standard. Now countries that suggest abandoning the Euro 
could create a run on the banking system making it to collapse together with 
government lending. The risks are not only for the country that leave the Euro-
zone but also for the entire Euro-zone financial system. As Edward Chancellor 
states in its intervention in the Financial Times: “Euro-fetters are proving 
scarcely less agonizing and certainly more binding than the golden variety” 
(Chancellor, 2010). 
Even if the risks of leaving the Euro are great some members can choose to 
disregard its treaty obligations. To reintroduce a national currency, an extremely 
coordination had to be set in motion since all the financial assets and liabilities 
of residents has to be converted instantly. The conversion had to be immediate 
to avoid investors from withdrawing their money and that is the only way to 
avoid financial instability. Parliamentary democracies are not known to take 
overnight decisions, and so most probably this situation is unadoptable 
(Eichengreen & Temin, 2010). 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The Great Recession as well as the Great Financial crisis started in a similar 
manner, they started in a period of great development. The 1920’s was the 
decade of the “Roaring twenties” and the excessive laxity on regulatory 
measures regarding the real estate sector. In the 2000’s it was the laxity on 
regulatory measures over the shadow banking system or subprime sector. Both 
events created a bubble on real estate. 
The first reactions of those in charge were similar. When realizing that there 
was excess liquidity in the market, the first logic solution that appeared was to 
shrink the money supply. 
However there is a great difference between what happened after. During 
the Great Depression the liquidity wasn’t restored because the Gold Standard 
was restricting monetary policy. It was only in 1931 that the Fed realized it 
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needed to increase liquidity. During the Great Depression there was no lender 
of last resort and there were no institutions to maintain financial stability. In the 
recent crisis, there are all those kinds of mechanisms to prevent financial 
instability. During the recent crisis, the Fed didn’t follow its job of lender of last 
resort to the fullest, or else Lehman Brothers would never be allowed to fail. 
This was a mistake by the Fed, as it created panic, but at least this time the 
panics and runs on banks were somewhat controlled, or at least they were less 
severe. 
During the Great Depression there was a belief that if the wages continued 
high, this would help the economy to prosper, because consumption would be 
kept high. In a time where there were still a lot of sectors that produced labor 
intensive goods, the high wages would lower their productivity. The prices were 
low due to the deflationary policies and companies couldn’t keep the same 
workers as before. Those who could fire some of the staff would do it, the 
others would have to close doors. The conversations between the main actors 
of the economy has prevented unemployment to spread like it did back in the 
1930’s. It didn’t even reach half of the 25% observed back in 1933. The 
measures taken have prevented unemployment to increase like it did. 
During the 1930’s international cooperation was a joke. It was every country 
for itself, and as soon as things worsened US tried to protect its internal 
markets. The way to do that was by increasing imported products tariffs, but this 
kind of solution created retaliation worldwide.  As expected World trade dropped 
by more than 60% between 1929 and 1934. The lack of trade as depressed 
prices even more. Fortunately this time there were no restraints to World Trade, 
although it dropped, this time it was due to uncertainty. Trade barriers would not 
last today since products are manufactured with parts assembled all over the 
world. Obama’s administration knows that the right way to fight the crisis is by 
increasing exports, and so it launched a program to double exports. This 
program was built with the intention of helping exporting companies and to 
make international trade fairest for everyone. China has used financial 
maneuvers to keep the renminbi low but to turn the market fairer, China has to 
appreciate its currency.  
To prevent any further financial crisis the policy makers of the Great 
Depression adopted a set of rules to protect the economy. After some decades 
those rules were forgotten. Now in the recent crisis those rules have been 
brought back to life. This time, the lax in those rules permitted banks to evolve 
to a size considered too big to fail, and if a single of those banks went bankrupt 
it would create a large monetary contraction. This is exactly what happened.  
Regarding government spending there is a similarity between the two crisis, 
the government is spending to stimulate the economy, but the similarity ends 
there. The weight of government spending compared to the GDP is totally 
different. While in 1929 government spending vs GDP was of about 10 per cent 
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in US, today it is close to 40 per cent. Also in the Great Depression it took a lot 
of time for the government to initiate a financial stimulus, this time six months 
after the crisis Obama’s administration was already employing financial 
stimulus. Although a stimulus to the economy could be a double sided blade, on 
one side you can try to prevent the economy to stabilize or even grow, on the 
other side that stimulus has to be financed somehow. US doesn’t have the kind 
of reserves to initiate a major internal stimulus, and to do so it needs to print 
money, which causes the dollar to drop. It also needs to financed abroad most 
likely by China, but with the dollar dropping it can hurt their cooperation. In the 
end all this financing has to come from future taxes. Will the benefits of today’s 
stimulus be greater than tomorrow’s sacrifices? 
In the Great Depression the gold standard was one of the major problems 
that prevented the economy to fully recover. Today, there is a fixed exchange 
rate standing, the Euro. There is a belief that the Euro is aggravating even 
further the World Crisis. In a fixed exchange rate there should be countries that 
are expanding and others contracting, this is the only way for a fixed exchange 
rate to stand. During the Great Depression there was no international 
cooperation and so the gold standard couldn’t stand. Today, with the Euro, 
history is repeating itself. The main countries of the Euro are taking 
contractionary measures, those kinds of policies hurt even more the countries 
that were already in financial difficulties. The international cooperation of today 
is growing and there are common policies between the Euro-zone to prevent a 
new gold standard. The World should keep their fingers crossed and hope 
those joint policies are effective. If Europeans abandon the Euro project World 
Economy will suffer, being US the country that will suffer the most, apart from 
the European countries, as the Euro functions as a backup reserve currency for 
the dollar. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
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5 Conclusion and Future Work 
The objective of this thesis was to develop the theme of the similarities 
between the Great Depression and current crisis already known as the Great 
Financial Crisis or the Subprime Crisis.  
In the first chapter, it was discussed the primary objectives of the thesis 
along with the methodology used to reach those objectives, being the 
methodology used theoretical and descriptive. 
The second chapter starts with a brief description of the US economy in the 
early twentieth century, the standard of living of American citizens and its beliefs 
and social characteristics. It is followed by a description and evolution on the 
main areas that affected the Great Depression to become the most severe 
economic crisis known to date.  
The third chapter is similar to the second, but this time it is the Great 
Financial crisis that is explained. 
In the fourth chapter the similarities and differences between the two crises 
are analyzed. It is analyzed how the Fed and the Government dealt with the 
crisis and if there was a difference in their behavior according to past 
experiences.  
In this chapter the main conclusions will be debated according to personal 
interpretation, as well as future studies. 
Along the way to beat the current crisis we have stumbled upon some 
similarities between it and the Great Depression. 
The resemblances start when an analysis of the economy before the crisis is 
made. Both of the crises were preceded by a time of great expansion, of great 
technological progress, and great progress within the banking system. 
The Great Depression started after the “Roaring Twenties”. During this 
period, the families were being offered easy credit, there were no effective 
regulations to ensure that the financial effort of those families wouldn’t be 
surpassed. The low requirements to get credit were making families to obtain 
credit to invest, even in risky markets. The most appreciated way of investment 
was households followed by the stock market. Everyone wanted to take part on 
the gains of the real estate and stock market and so a bubble was formed. In 
the recent crisis there were more restrictions on credit, but the real estate sector 
was flourishing more than ever, since financial institutions have found a way to 
continue borrowing to that specific sector. The way financial institutions 
managed to do this was through the Shadow Banking System or the Subprime 
loans. The Subprime loans were risky but because they are gathered in a pool 
of assets it was thought that the risks would be somewhat controlled.  
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The unmeasured risk and the bubble formed during both crises had the 
same reaction by policy makers, which was to contract credit to prevent the 
bubble to get any bigger. What happened after the contraction was also similar 
on both crises, the bubble burst and financial difficulties started. 
The contraction created to avoid the real estate and the stock market to 
increase had spread to other sectors. The policymakers of then and now, 
believed there would be no spillovers to the rest of the economy. They were 
wrong then and they are wrong now. The contraction spread through all the 
economy and the decline in general consumption was a fact. The money supply 
reduced drastically. To continue to produce at full capacity firms had to lower 
their prices and so in time their revenues weren’t enough to secure their costs. 
Due to this, unemployment has raised to percentages of 25% during the Great 
Depression, while in the recent crisis unemployment was almost 10% because 
the government has intervened. In the recent crisis Obama’s administration has 
in mind that the way to increase unemployment is to increase exports and his 
policies are having strong results. In the Great Depression the policies were the 
complete opposite, tariffs were created to protect the national production which 
have hurt even more the Economy since there was retaliation from other 
countries and World Trade dropped substantially. 
One other way to revert the unemployment situation was to turn the wages 
flexible. This wasn’t accomplished in the Great Depression since Unions were 
too powerful, and there was a strong belief that if wages were kept high the 
private consumption would eventually increase. This belief only created more 
unemployment. This time the government has adjusted wages, but there is still 
a concern on how the wages will be adjusted again and if it will create an 
inflationary movement once they are readjusted. 
The unemployment and the contraction of the economy created on both 
crises, led a number of financial institutions to fail. The runs on banks by the 
population to secure their money has crushed many financial institutions, but 
while in the Great Depression there was no role of lender of last resort this time 
there is one. Another big difference is that where in the Great Depression there 
were a big number of small banks, the recent crisis was formed by a small 
number of big banks that were considered too big to fail. It is proven now that 
they weren’t too big to fail since the collapse of Bear Sterns in March 2008. The 
Fed has brilliantly played the role of lender of last resort until the time Lehman 
Brothers succumbed to the pressure, and its first mistake was to let it file for 
bankruptcy. The panics could somehow be controlled if the Fed had rescued 
Lehman Brothers. By not helping Lehman Brothers the Fed has passed the 
wrong impression that the lender of last resort couldn’t bear the mistakes of 
institutions that contracted an exceedingly amount of risk. The financial distress 
and the uncertainty created during the Great Depression and now, had similar 
effects. People were struggling for liquidity, and so they started to sell stocks 
and real estate. The surplus of stocks and real estate created a “fire sale” as 
107 
 
prices decreased abruptly. Companies and families that were in financial 
distress were obliged to sell, and to do so they had to sell at prices lower than 
their real value. A downward movement of prices was created.  
Both crisis stand equal in one thing, the government spent and it still is 
spending large amounts of money to try and change the situation at hand. 
There is a huge difference in the size and role of the government from then and 
now. During the Great Depression the government spending vs GDP was of 10 
percent, now it is around 40 percent. And the amount to restart the economy is 
far superior now than it was back then. Also in the Great Depression the 
spending only took place when Roosevelt took charge and increased 
dramatically the role of the government in social welfare, Obama’s 
administration only took 6 months to drastically increase government spending. 
We have to bear in mind that spending has two sides, if it is well applied it can 
fuel the economy to a point where the government doesn’t need to increase that 
much taxes in the future to pay for those investments. This will happen if the 
economy starts to cheer up and it will produce enough tax money to pay those 
past investments. On the other side, the spending has to always be financed 
somehow and in the end it has to come through taxes. If the spending doesn’t 
change the situation of the economy the taxes have to eventually raise a lot 
more than expected, which causes a downward spiral since taxes will create a 
contraction of the economy. In the Great Depression the downward spiral was 
stopped by the increase in consumption caused by World War II, this time the 
government has to be extra careful where to spend the taxpayers money. 
During the Great Depression the economy was living for the first time in a 
liquidity trap. To pump the economy again the Fed got interest rates so low that 
the population in general preferred to save than to invest. In a liquidity trap a 
general belief is created that interest rates have only one way to go, which is 
up. That is exactly what happened during the Great Depression the monetary 
policy became ineffective. The lack of investment will cause deflation since it is 
preferred to hold money than to invest.  
Economists thought liquidity traps were lost in time, but they reappeared in 
1990 in Japan. Now US is facing a liquidity trap of its own. There are three ways 
to exit from a liquidity trap, but all these ways have severe consequences. 
Obama’s administration can take advantage of low interest rates to invest, but 
doing so will increase the deficit and when the interest rates get up again it can 
severely damage the economy. One other way is to devalue the currency, 
which will boost exports, but being the dollar the world reserve currency it can 
affect Global Trade in general.   The other way out of a liquidity trap is if the Fed 
can convince everyone that is going to create inflation, maintaining interest 
rates. In this case inflation-adjusted interest rates will drop below zero and 
borrowing and investing will resume shortly. The only problem in this last 
solution is that the objective of the Fed is to obtain price stability, and so 
inflation has to be controlled. 
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At last there is the fixed exchange rate problem. The gold standard was the 
fixed exchange rate at the time of the Great Depression and the persistence in 
keeping faithful to their principles has created the money contraction that was 
discussed before, there couldn’t be any printing of money without increasing 
gold reserves, and since there was no international cooperation the gold flows 
only went to a small number of countries. The countries that were amassing the 
gold have sterilized it since it wasn’t used to invest. The gold standard has 
become unbearable. Today there are two types of fixed exchange rate active, a 
formal fixed exchange rate, the Euro, and an informal exchange rate, the dollar 
used as a reserve currency of the World. The dollar is now dependent of the 
Euro, since the Euro is the currency that can substitute the dollar as a reserve 
currency, but the Euro has its flaws. The main flaws of the Euro are similar to 
the flaws of the gold standard and it added new ones. The Euro like the gold 
standard doesn’t permit to print money at the countries own volition, the Euro 
has gone a step further and abolished the national currencies and created a 
single institute that can print money for all the members. Another requirement 
for a fixed exchange rate to survive is cooperation, during the Great Depression 
international cooperation failed miserably, it was every country for itself. Today, 
although there is much more cooperation than before it still isn’t enough, the 
countries with superavit should continue to invest so the countries that are 
struggling can have a chance to balance their debts. The main powers of 
Europe have developed austerity measures to save money, this behavior will 
greatly affect the European economy. As the crisis evolves the cooperation is 
increasing and there are signs of improvement in the Euro-zone, the million 
dollar question is will it be on time? Will the distressed european countries like 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and Ireland stand the pressure and avoid 
abandoning the Euro? 
The gold standard like the Euro doesn’t have an escape hatch for countries 
that want/need to abandon the fixed exchange rate, but now the price to 
abandon the Euro is far greater than before. If the Euro doesn’t stand it can 
create a crisis which some economists already name like the “Mother of all 
Financial Crisis”. I believe it will be harsh for the countries that need to abandon 
the Euro, but the same was said for the countries that abandoned the gold 
standard and they recovered faster than the ones that stuck to it. Although I 
don’t believe the consequences will be the same. 
 
For future work a comparison between what finally ended the recent crisis 
and the Great Depression should be studied, as well as the development of the 
Euro. Will the Euro stand or will it be like the gold standard?  
Another important work should be the study of the government spending 
of today compared with the sacrifices of tomorrow. Was it the right thing to do? 
109 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
111 
6 References 
1. A world of possible futures. (n.d.). Monetary & fiscal stat comparisons 
1929 and now. Retrieved 2011, December 15, from 
http://www.nowandfutures.com/great_depression.html;  
2. Ahearn, R. (2009, March). The Global Economic Downturn and 
Protectionism (Congressional Research Service Report for 
Congress). Retrieved from U.S. Department of State website 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/122317.pdf; 
3. Aiginger, K. (2010). The Great Recession vs. the Great Depression: 
Stylized Facts on Siblings That Were Given Different Foster Parents. 
Economics, The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal , 4 
(2010-18), pp.1-41. Retrieved from http://www.economics-
ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2010-18. doi: 
10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-18; 
4. Anonymous (1993 March). The Gold Standard Revisited. The 
Economist, 326 (7801), pp. 79; 
5. Anonymous (2008, December/2009 January). A voice of Reason. 
Directorship, 34 (6), pp. 16-17. Retrieved from 
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/41947596/A-Voice-of-Reason; 
6. Anonymous. (2009, September 20). Hoover’s pro-labor stance helped 
cause Great Depression, UCLA economist says. VerticalNews 
Science. Retrieved from 
http://www.verticalnews.com/newsletters/NewsRx-Science/2009-09-
20/80NRS.html; 
7. Awesome stories. (n.d.). Graph: Unemployment in the Great 
Depression. Retrieved 14 dezembro 2011, from 
http://www.awesomestories.com/assets/graph-unemployment-in-the-
great-depression 
8. Barofsky, N. (2011, March 29). Where the Bailout Went Wrong. The 
New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/opinion/30barofsky.html?_r=0;  
9. Basile, P., Landon-Lane, J. & Rockoff, H. (2010). Money and Interest 
Rates in The United States During the Great Depression [Working 
Paper Nº 16204]. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16204.pdf; 
10. Benham, F. (1932). The Balance of trade, chapter 18 in William 
Beveridge (ed), Tariffs: The Case Examined, London: Longmans, pp. 
244-260; 
112 
11. Bernanke, B. (2000). Essays on the Great Depression. Princeton, NJ: 
Priceton University Press; 
12. Bootle, R. (2012, June 10). Spooky parallels between Great 
Depression ande euro crisis. The Telegraph. Retrieved from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/9322687/Spooky-
parallels-between-Great-Depression-and-euro-crisis.html;  
13. Bordo, M. & James, H. (2009). The Great Depression Analogy 
[Working Paper Nº 15584]. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15584.pdf; 
14. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.) Average Annual Unemployment 
Rate. Retrieved 2012, May 2, from http://www.bls.gov/home.htm;  
15. Butkiewicz, J. (2005). Governor Eugene Meyer and The Great 
Contraction [Working Paper Nº 2005-01]. Working Paper Series, 
Department of Economics Alfred Lerner College of Business & 
Economics of University of Delaware, Delaware, USA. Retrieved from 
http://www.lerner.udel.edu/economics/WorkingPapers/2005/UDWP20
05-01.pdf;  
16. Buttonwood (2010 February 3). Fixed rates and the euro-zone: The 
new gold standard [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2010/02/fixed_rates_an
d_euro-zone/print;  
17. Carida, R. (2010, October). What Has – and Has Not – Been Learned 
about Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Environment? A Review of 
the 2000s. Paper presented at the Boston Federal Reserve Bank 
Conference, Boston.  Retrieved from 
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf55/papers/Clarida.pdf; 
18. Case, K. & Shiller, R. (2004). Is there a Bubble in The Housing 
Market?. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 34 (2), pp. 299-362. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2003_2_
bpea_papers/2003b_bpea_caseshiller.pdf; 
19. Catalpa Capital (2012). Catalpa Research: First. Retrieved 2012, 
June 20, from http://www.catalpacapital.com/dibs/30-january-2012/;  
20. Cerdikwan (2010, December 23). Challenges To The Multilateral 
Trading System: The Rising Trade Protectionism Amid The Global 
Economic Recession [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://www.bappenas.go.id/blog/?author=20;  
21. Chancellor, E. (2010, July 11). Euro fetters are an agonizing bind. 
The Financial Times. Retrieved from 
113 
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/98e846dc-8b85-11df-ab4d-
00144feab49a.html#axzz26rOGV6LR;  
22. CNCB – Boom, Bust & Blame, The Inside Story of America’s 
Economic Crisis (n.d.). By The Numbers. Retrieved 2012, May 2, 
from http://www.cnbc.com/id/31524954/#smo;  
23. Cohen-Setton, J. (2012, March 30). The Gold Standard and the Euro 
[Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://www.bruegel.org/blog/detail/article/725-blogs-review-the-gold-
standard-and-the-euro;  
24. Cole, H. & Ohanian, L. (1999). The Great Depression in the United 
States From A Neoclassical Perspective. Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 23 (1), pp. 2-24. Retrieved from 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/qr/qr2311.pdf;  
25. Cole, H. & Ohanian, L. (2004). New Deal Policies and the Persistence 
of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis. Journal of 
Political Economy, 112 (4), pp. 779-816. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.1086/421169?uid=3738880&uid=2&u
id=4&sid=21101256331447; 
26. Cole, H. & Ohanian, L. (2011, September 26). Stimulus and the 
Depression: The Untold Story. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405311190478740457653214
1884735626.html;  
27. Eichengreen, B. & Flandreau, M. (1997). Gold Standard In Theory & 
History (2ed). Oxon, USA;  
28. Eichengreen, B. & Temim P. (2010). Fetters of Gold and Paper. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 26 (3), pp.370-384. Retrieved 
from http://oxrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/26/3/370.abstract?cited-
by=yes&legid=oxrep;26/3/370. doi: 10.1093/oxrep/grq018; 
29. Eichengreen, B. & Temin, P. (1997). The Gold Standard and the 
Great Depression [Working Paper Nº 6060]. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6060.pdf; 
30. Eichengreen, B. & Temin, P. (2000). The Gold Standard and the 
Great Depression. Contemporary European History, 9 (2), pp. 183-
207. Retrieved from 
http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0960777300002010; 
31. Eichengreen, B. (1995). Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the 
Great Deprression, 1919-1939. Oxford University Press New York;  
32. Eichengreen, B., Mody, A., Nedeljkovic, M. & Sarno, L. (2009). How 
the Subprime Crisis went Global: Evidence from Bank Credit Default 
114 
Swap Spreads [Working Paper Nº 14904]. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14904.pdf; 
33. Eyermann, C. (2011, March 11). To Whom Does the U.S. 
Government Realyy Owe Money? Retrieved from 
http://www.mygovcost.org/blog/page/30/;  
34. Fishback, P., Haines & Kantor, S. (2005). Births, Deaths, and New 
Deal Relief During The Great Depressio [Working Paper Nº 11246]. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved 
from http://www.nber.org/papers/w11246.pdf; 
35. Friedman, M. & Schwartz A. (1963). A Monetary History of the United 
States, 1867-1960. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press;  
36. Friedman, M. (1953). Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press; 
37. Galbraith, J. (2009). The Great Crash 1929. Boston, USA: Houghton 
Miffin Harcourt;  
38. Gramm, P. (2010, October 1). Echoes of the Great Depression. Wall 
Street Journal. Retrieved from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870411600457552235
1201224286.html;  
39. Granville, J. (1995 October). Apocalypse Soon. Barron’s, 75 (40), pp. 
48-49; 
40. Grossman, R. & Meissner, C. (2010). International Aspects Of The 
Great Depression And The Crisis Of 2007: Similarities, Differences, 
And Lessons [Working Paper Nº 16269]. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16269.pdf; 
41. Gwartney, J., Stroup, R., Sobel, R. & Macpherson, D. (2010). 
Economics: Private and Public Choice (13 ed.). Mason, USA: South-
Western College Pub; 
42. Hummel, J. (2011). Ben Bernanke versus Milton Friedman: The 
Federal Reserve’s Emergence as the U.S. Economy’s Central 
Planner. The Independent Review, 15 (4), pp. 485-518. Retrieved 
from http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_15_04_1_hummel.pdf;  
43. International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Department. (2009, 
November 3). The State of Public Finances Cross-Country Fiscal 
Monitor: November 2009 (Publication SPN/09/25). Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0925.pdf;  
115 
44. Jagannathan, R., Kapoor, M. & Schaumburg, E. (2009). Causes of 
The Great Recession of 2007-9: The Financial Crisis in The Symptom 
Not The Disease [Working Paper Nº 15404]. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15404.pdf; 
45. Kindleberger, C. (1986). The World in Depression – Revised and 
Enlarge Edition, 1929-1939. California, USA: University of California 
Press;  
46. Kraner, S. (2010). Causes of The Great Depression and the Great 
Financial Crisis. Diploma Thesis Unpublished, Fakulteta Za 
Management Koper of Univerza Na Primorskem, Koper; 
47. Krugman, P. (2009). The Return of Depression Economics and the 
Crisis of 2008. New York, USA: W.W. Norton & Company;  
48. Leite, J. (May, 2005). História Económica do Século XX. Lecture 
notes: University of Aveiro; 
49. Lindert, P. (1969). Key currencies and gold, 1900-1913. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press; 
50. Lowrey, A. (2012, January 20). Obama Vow on Exports Is on Track, 
With Help. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/business/us-on-track-to-meet-
goal-of-higher-exports.html?_r=0;  
51. McCulley, P. & Pozsar, Z. (2012, March). Does Central Bank 
Independence Frustrate the Optimal Fiscal-Monetary Policy Mix in a 
Liquidity Trap? Paper presented at the Inaugural Meeting of the 
Global Interdependence Center´s Society of Fellows, Paris; 
52. McMahon, F. (2009, October). Is the recession ending? Policy 
mistakes, past and present. Fraser Forum, (10/09), pp.14-18. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/publicationdisplay.aspx?id=10841&term
s=Is+the+recession+ending%3f;  
53. Mishkin, F. (2009). Monetary Policy Strategy. Cambridge, USA: The 
MIT Press;  
54. Mishkin, F. (2010). Over The Cliff: From The Subprime To The Global 
Financial Crisis [Working Paper Nº 16609]. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16609.pdf; 
55. Mitchener, K. (1991). Supervision, Regulation, and Financial 
Instability: The Political Economy of Banking During the Great 
Depression. PhD Thesis, University of California, Berkeley; 
116 
56. O’Brien, A. (1989). A Behavioral Explanation for Nominal Wage 
Rigidity during the Great Depression. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
104, pp. 719-735; 
57. Ohanian, L. (2009). What – or Who – Started the Great Depression? 
[Working Paper Nº 15258]. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15258.pdf;  
58. Ohanian, L. (2010). The Economic Crisis from a Neoclassical 
Perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24 (4), pp. 45-66. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.24.4.45. doi:b 
10.1257/jep.24.4.45 ; 
59. Ohanian, L. (2011). Accounting for the Great Recession. The Region, 
25 (2), pp. 42-52. Retrieved from 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/11-06/epp_recession.pdf; 
60. Parker, R. (2002). Reflections on The Great Depression. – 
Northampton MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
61. Parker, R. (2007). The Economics of the Great Depression – A 
Twenty-First Century Look Back at the Economics of the Interwar 
Era. Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 
62. Randolfe. (2006, December 6). How Far Will Your House’s Price 
Fall? [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://randolfe.typepad.com/randolfe/2006/12/how_far_will_yo.html;  
63. Romer, C. (2003, December 20) Forthcoming in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica. Econometrics Laboratory Software Archive. Retrieved 
from http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~cromer/great_depression.pdf;  
64. Romer, C. (2009). Lessons from the Great Depression for Economic 
Recovery in 2009. Revista de Economía Institucional, 2 (21), pp. 25-
35. Retrieved from 
http://www.economiainstitucional.com/pdf/No21/cromer21.pdf; 
65. Rothbard, M. (2000). America’s Great Depression (5ª ed.). Mises 
Institute of Alabama. Retrieved from 
http://library.mises.org/books/Murray%20N%20Rothbard/Americas%2
0Great%20Depression.pdf;  
66. Scheplick. (2012, May 2). Schools of Thought: Saltwater and 
Freshwater Economics. Stock Twits U – A Consortium of University 
Trading and Investment Clubs. Retrieved from 
http://www.stocktwitsu.com/schools-of-thought-saltwater-and-
freshwater-economics/; 
117 
67. Schlenkhoff, G. (2009). Can Great Depression Theories Explain The 
Great Recession. Master Thesis Unpublished, European Business 
School of International University Schloss Reichartshausen, 
Germany; 
68. Shiller, R. (2006). Irrational Exuberance. 2ed. Broadway Books New 
York;  
69. Smith, Y. (2010, July 4). Steve Keen’s Scary Model [Web log post]. 
Retrieved from http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/07/steve-
keens-scary-minsky-model.html; 
70. Smith, Y. (2012, December 15). Revisiting Rehypothecation: JP 
Morgan Markets Its Latest Doomsday Machine (or Why Repo May 
Blow Up the Financial System Again [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/12/revisiting-rehypothecation-
jp-morgan-markets-its-latest-doomsday-machine-or-why-repo-may-
blow-up-the-financial-system-again.html;  
71. Smithson, J. (2009, September 17). Dow Jones Industrial Average 
from 1925 to 1955 [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://midknightgraphs.blogspot.pt/2009/09/dow-jones-industrial-
average-from-1925.html#!/2009/09/dow-jones-industrial-average-
from-1925.html;  
72. Temin, P. (1994). The Great Depression [Working Paper Nº 62]. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved 
from http://www.nber.org/papers/h0062;  
73. Temin, P. (2010). The Great Recession and The Great Depression 
[Working Paper Nº 15645]. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15645.pdf; 
74. Weidner, D. (2010, August 5). The Innocents of 1933. Wall Street 
Journal. Retrieved from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870401790457540933
4043400658.html;  
75. White, E. (2009). Lessons From The Great American Real Estate 
Boom And Bust Of The 1920’s [Working Paper Nº 15573]. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15573.pdf; 
76. Widmaier, W. (2001). A Constructivist Theory of International 
Monetary Relations: Monetary Understandings, State Interests in 
Cooperation and the Construction of Crisis. PhD Thesis, Faculty of 
the Graduate School of the University of Texas, Austin; 
118 
77. Yglesias, M. (2011, September 28) Cole And Ohanian’s Puzzling 
Chart. Think Progress. Retrieved from 
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/09/28/331248/cole-and-
ohanians-puzzling-chart/. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
